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CHAPTER 11’S RENEGOTIATION FRAMEWORK AND THE
PURPOSE OF CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY
Anthony J. Casey*
A fundamental question for corporate bankruptcy law is why it
exists in the ﬁrst place. Why are there special rules that apply only in
ﬁnancial distress? The conventional law-and-economics answer—
known as the Creditors’ Bargain Theory—identiﬁes two core purposes of
bankruptcy law: recreating a hypothetical ex ante bargain and respecting
creditors’ nonbankruptcy entitlements.
This Article challenges the Creditors’ Bargain Theory and presents
an alternative: The sole purpose of corporate bankruptcy law is to solve
the incomplete contracting problem that accompanies ﬁnancial distress.
Because ﬁnancial distress is difficult to contract over, relationships
involving a distressed ﬁrm are governed by incomplete contracts that
allow parties to hold each other up. All distressed ﬁrms face this same
value-destroying hold-up problem, and so pressure arises for a uniform
solution. The purpose of corporate bankruptcy law is to provide that
solution.
In the United States, Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code
implements this purpose in the form of a framework for ex post
renegotiation of incomplete contracts. This framework imposes judicial
oversight and allocates bargaining power to minimize hold up among
those with interests in a distressed ﬁrm. In a sense, it puts in place
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guardrails that give the parties room to bargain while keeping them from
engaging in extreme forms of hold up. While this framework is not based
on any hypothetical ex ante bargain and gives no special deference to
nonbankruptcy entitlements, it is the fundamental attribute of Chapter 11.
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INTRODUCTION
Corporate bankruptcy presents a puzzle. Why does the law provide
special rules that apply only in ﬁnancial distress? One can imagine1—or
advocate for—a world in which no such rules exist. But that is not the
world we live in. Bankruptcy laws do exist in the United States and in most
major legal systems throughout the world. And so to confront the puzzle,
one must identify the purpose that bankruptcy law serves. This Article
attempts to do just that and then shows how United States bankruptcy law
pursues that purpose.
In short, corporate bankruptcy law’s proper purpose is to solve the
incomplete contracting problem that accompanies ﬁnancial distress. And
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code implements that
purpose—perhaps imperfectly—by facilitating a structured renegotiation
that allows parties to preserve value in the face of hold-up threats.2 This
Article suggests that the creation of this bargaining framework for
renegotiation is the fundamental attribute of Chapter 11.
Thus, contrary to the prevailing view, the purpose of bankruptcy law
is not to vindicate or mimic some hypothetical ex ante bargain among
creditors.3 That idea—the Creditors’ Bargain Theory4—is, at best, a
shorthand for the unexceptional claim that bankruptcy law should be
1. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 173, 174 (1987) [hereinafter Baird, World Without Bankruptcy].
2. Chapter 11 is the part of the United States Bankruptcy Code setting forth the rules
speciﬁc to the reorganization of business entities. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101–1195 (West 2020).
By contrast, Chapter 7 deals with businesses and individuals who are liquidating their assets.
Id. §§ 701–784. Provisions of other Chapters, like Chapters 1, 3, and 5, apply to all
bankruptcy cases. Barry E. Adler, Anthony J. Casey & Edward R. Morrison, Baird & Jackson’s
Bankruptcy Cases, Problems, and Materials 31–35 (5th ed. 2020).
3. This prevailing view derives from the scholarship of Professors Douglas Baird and
Thomas Jackson. See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law
and Its Proper Domain, 38 Vand. L. Rev. 829, 835–36 (1985) (“The ambition of the law
governing the debtor-creditor relationship . . . should provide all the parties with the type
of contract that they would have agreed to if they had had the time and money to bargain
over all aspects of their deal.”); Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy
Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain, 91 Yale L.J. 857, 860 (1982) [hereinafter Jackson,
Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements and the Creditors’ Bargain] (arguing that bankruptcy law
should “mirror the agreement one would expect the creditors to form among themselves
were they able to negotiate such an agreement from an ex ante position”). More recently,
Baird himself has criticized this theory. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen,
Antibankruptcy, 119 Yale L.J. 648, 652–53 (2010) [hereinafter Baird & Rasmussen,
Antibankruptcy] (discussing how today’s ﬁnancial structures and reorganization process are
“quite at odds with the standard account of corporate reorganizations”); Douglas G. Baird
& Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751, 755 (2002)
[hereinafter Baird & Rasmussen, End of Bankruptcy] (“Today’s investors allocate control
rights among themselves through elaborate and sophisticated contracts that already
anticipate ﬁnancial distress. In the presence of these contracts, a law of corporate
reorganizations is largely unnecessary.”).
4. See Jackson, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements and the Creditors’ Bargain, supra note
3, at 858 (introducing and applying the Creditors’ Bargain Theory).
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efficient. In a hypothetical world of perfect information, zero transaction
costs, and rational behavior, the interested parties (assuming one can
deﬁne that category) would agree to efficient rules. But that is a truism
that applies to almost any efficiency problem in law. All-knowing rational
actors will always bargain to the efficient outcome when bargaining costs
are zero.5
But what should the law do when bargaining costs are high and
information is limited? That is the bankruptcy question. Or, to be a little
more precise, what should the law do when a particular set of relationships
repeatedly presents the same problem of high bargaining costs and limited
information? To that question, the hypothetical bargain is not responsive.
It assumes perfect information and zero bargaining costs in a world where
neither can ever be achieved. In a sense, the parties cannot write a
complete contract because of uncertainty, and the Creditors’ Bargain
Theory responds by instructing lawmakers—who face the same
uncertainty—to write a complete contract for them.6
Even worse, the Creditors’ Bargain framework often leads scholars to
focus on the wrong questions. For example, by focusing attention on the
initial bargain, the framework attracts reform proposals designed to bring
all creditors to the ex ante bargaining table.7 But the real problem for any
bankruptcy contract—or legislation—is not in convening the bargainers.
It is in dealing ex post with the incomplete terms those parties actually
drafted. This is a classic problem in law,8 and the Creditors’ Bargain
Theory distracts from its importance.9

5. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 15 (1960) (“[I]f
such market transactions are costless, such a rearrangement of rights will always take place
if it would lead to an increase in the value of production.”).
6. See Jackson, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements and the Creditors’ Bargain, supra note
3, at 860 (explaining that the Creditors’ Bargain approach involves “view[ing] bankruptcy
as a system designed to mirror the agreement one would expect the creditors to form among
themselves were they able to negotiate such an agreement from an ex ante position”).
7. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler & Marcel Kahan, The Technology of Creditor Protection,
161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1773, 1794–809 (2013) (proposing a mechanism to facilitate remedies
against third parties); Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice: A Menu Approach to
Corporate Bankruptcy; 71 Tex. L. Rev. 51, 100–11 (1992) [hereinafter Rasmussen, A Menu
Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy] (offering a menu system to facilitate investor assent);
Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy Workouts and Debt Contracts, 36 J.L. & Econ. 595, 630–31
(1993) (advocating for private resolutions in place of mandatory rules); David A. Skeel, Jr.,
Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 Tex. L. Rev.
471, 524–25 (1994) (arguing for state law systems to encourage private ordering).
8. In contract law it leads to incomplete contracts. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling
Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87, 92–
93 (1989) [hereinafter Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps]; Oliver Hart & John Moore,
Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 Econometrica 755, 756 (1988). In public law
it leads to vague standards. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis,
42 Duke L.J. 557, 562–63 (1992).
9. Similarly, the framework attracts projects attempting to predict what creditors have
or would have agreed to. That is not a relevant inquiry. See infra section I.D.
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The Creditors’ Bargain Theory has also nurtured the fallacy that
bankruptcy law is primarily about preserving nonbankruptcy entitlements.10 This idea—the Butner Principle11—is a corollary to the Creditors’
Bargain Theory and is often viewed as an additional source from which to
derive bankruptcy’s core purpose.12 But this gets things wrong. The

10. “Nonbankruptcy entitlements” refers to rights that parties have when bankruptcy
law does not apply. These rights exist by operation of statute, contract, or any other source
of law unconnected with the bankruptcy system. Jackson, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements and
the Creditors’ Bargain, supra note 3, at 858 & n.8.
11. Baird and Jackson coined the term by “grabbing onto a phrase from an otherwise
forgettable Supreme Court case [Butner v. United States].” Thomas H. Jackson, A
Retrospective Look at Bankruptcy’s New Frontiers, 166 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1867, 1872 (2018)
[hereinafter Jackson, A Retrospective Look] (citing Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48
(1979)). The Court’s opinion in Butner presented a rather vanilla canon of textualist
interpretation: The Bankruptcy Code only includes provisions that are found in or implied
by its text. Butner, 440 U.S. at 54–55. Baird and Jackson consciously transformed this idea
into a broader normative statement of a core bankruptcy principle. See Jackson, A
Retrospective Look, supra, at 1872–73 & n.18.
12. For the original formations of the Butner Principle, see Thomas H. Jackson, The
Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law 20–33 (1986) [hereinafter Jackson, Logic and Limits]
(explaining the justiﬁcation for respecting nonbankruptcy entitlements); Douglas G. Baird
& Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership
Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 97, 110 (1984) [hereinafter Baird & Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations]
(noting that bankruptcy is primarily focused on “recognizing nonbankruptcy
entitlements”); Jackson, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements and the Creditors’ Bargain, supra
note 3, at 859–60. On its predominance as a core theory, see Barry E. Adler, The
Questionable Axiom of Butner v. United States, in Bankruptcy Law Stories 11, 11 (Robert K.
Rasmussen ed., 2007) (questioning the principle’s place as an “uncontested axiom”
(quoting Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 Yale L.J. 573 (1998)));
Kenneth M. Ayotte & David A. Skeel Jr, Bankruptcy Law as a Liquidity Provider, 80 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 1557, 1565 (2013) (describing the principle as the second element of the theoretical
foundation of corporate bankruptcy); David Gray Carlson, Bankruptcy Theory and the
Creditors Bargain, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 453, 466 (1992) (critiquing the principle); Jackson, A
Retrospective Look, supra note 11, at 1872–73 (identifying the Butner Principle as the
starting point that brought clarity to the Creditors’ Bargain Theory); Melissa B. Jacoby &
Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy,
123 Yale L.J. 862, 892 (2014) [hereinafter Jacoby & Janger, Ice Cube Bonds] (proposing a
system with “careful attention to the scope of non-bankruptcy entitlements”); Melissa B.
Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Tracing Equity: Realizing and Allocating Value in Chapter 11,
96 Tex. L. Rev. 673, 682–83, 734 (2018) [hereinafter Jacoby & Janger, Tracing Equity]
(deriving bankruptcy’s core principles by tracing creditors’ state-law entitlements); Ronald
J. Mann, Bankruptcy and the Entitlements of the Government: Whose Money Is It Anyway?,
70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 993, 1000 (1995) (presenting a bankruptcy theory that “starts from
entitlements of the parties that exist before the bankruptcy system comes into play”); Bruce
A. Markell, Fair Equivalents and Market Prices: Bankruptcy Cramdown Interest Rates, 33
Emory Bankr. Devs. J. 91, 127 (2016) (deriving cramdown rules from nonbankruptcy
entitlements); Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy
as (Is) Civil Procedure, 61 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 931, 934 (2004) (“[B]ankruptcy law should
exist, essentially, in order to serve the interests of the holders of nonbankruptcy legal
entitlements.”); Juliet M. Moringiello, When Does Some Federal Interest Require a
Different Result?: An Essay on the Use and Misuse of Butner v. United States, 2015 U. Ill. L.
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bankruptcy system functions almost exclusively by doing the opposite of
what the Butner Principle instructs—it achieves its purpose by directly
interfering with nonbankruptcy entitlements.
This fallacy—that the Butner Principle is fundamental to bankruptcy
theory—arises, perhaps, from a misunderstanding of bankruptcy’s
efficiency goal. An efficient bankruptcy law should create more value than
it destroys, accounting for consequences in and out of bankruptcy. That
requires a balancing of effects across all states of the world, but it does not
require any special protection for nonbankruptcy entitlements. In short,
bankruptcy law should not be put into effect unless it creates net value.13
All of this is to say, the law-and-economics theory of corporate
bankruptcy needs to be restated. Though many scholars and lawyers
invoke the Creditors’ Bargain Theory and the Butner Principle, very few
rely on the truth of their substance. The building blocks of a new theory
can be found in much of today’s bankruptcy scholarship, which usually
advocates general efficiency goals,14 often notes the importance of ex post
bargaining,15 and sometimes emphasizes the importance of procedure
over substance.16 Many scholars and lawyers also agree—at least

Rev. 657, 665 (noting the iconic stature of the principle and that it has been cited thousands
of times).
13. If Butner is read to present this efficiency concept, it is a circular direction that
bankruptcy law should pursue its efficiency purpose (by altering nonbankruptcy rights) only
when it is efficient to do so. Jackson, A Retrospective Look, supra note 11, at 1872 n.18
(noting that the principle yields to “a clearly deﬁned bankruptcy-related reason for doing
so” (emphasis omitted)); see also Robert E. Scott, Through Bankruptcy with the Creditors’
Bargain Heuristic, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 690, 692 (1986) (“The cornerstone of this [creditors’
bargain heuristic] is the normative claim that pre-bankruptcy entitlements should be
impaired in bankruptcy only when necessary to maximize net asset distributions to the
creditors as a group . . . .”).
14. See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 12, at 1566 (invoking the Creditors’ Bargain Theory
but advocating a general “Efficiency Principle”).
15. See G. Eric Brunstad, Jr. & Mike Sigal, Competitive Choice Theory and the Broader
Implications of the Supreme Court’s Analysis in Bank of America v. 203 North LaSalle Street
Partnership, 54 Bus. Law. 1475, 1483–85 (1999) (noting bankruptcy creates “a better
decision-making environment”); Daniel J. Bussel & Kenneth N. Klee, Recalibrating Consent
in Bankruptcy, 83 Am. Bankr. L.J. 663, 669 (2009) (arguing bankruptcy alters
nonbankruptcy rights to facilitate consent); Diane Lourdes Dick, The Chapter 11 Efficiency
Fallacy, 2013 BYU L. Rev. 759, 766 (2013) [hereinafter Dick, Efficiency Fallacy] (noting but
critiquing the common view that bankruptcy law facilitates efficient renegotiation); Omer
Tene, Revisiting the Creditors’ Bargain: The Entitlement to the Going-Concern Surplus in
Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 19 Bankr. Devs. J. 287, 396 (2003) (arguing that
bankruptcy should provide a platform for negotiation).
16. See Pamela Foohey, Jevic’s Promise: Procedural Justice in Chapter 11, 93 Wash. L.
Rev. Online 128, 128–29 (2018) (discussing the importance of process in ensuring that
bankruptcy law does not “disregard[] the interests and voices of parties en masse, potentially
subverting the very tenet of value maximization”); Mooney, supra note 12, at 934–35
(providing an overview of a “procedure theory” of bankruptcy law).
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implicitly—that corporate bankruptcy has something to do with
facilitating ex post cooperation among stakeholders.17
This Article does not depart from the current literature on these basic
points. The challenge is in clearing away the distracting brush of old
theories to discover a full and proper theory. Thus, this Article presents
and justiﬁes the New Bargaining Theory of corporate bankruptcy and
demonstrates that Chapter 11’s renegotiation framework is consistent with
a rough attempt to implement that theory.
This Article presents two claims, one normative and one descriptive.
The normative claim is that bankruptcy’s proper purpose is to solve a
speciﬁc contracting failure. That failure arises because ﬁnancial distress
presents uncertainty that is not contractible.18 For a business ﬁrm,
ﬁnancial distress involves too many parties with strategic bargaining
incentives and too many contingencies for the ﬁrm and its creditors to
deﬁne a set of rules for every scenario. Moreover, the terms the parties do
contract for will often be unenforceable because the relevant
contingencies are impossible to verify to a court.19 Incomplete contracts
therefore govern a ﬁrm’s various relationships when distress arises.20 The
parties in those relationships can then take advantage of the
incompleteness to extract individual gains from each other—to hold each
other up. Any party who has speciﬁcally invested in its relationship with
the debtor is vulnerable to this hold-up threat.21
The problem cannot be solved by ex ante rules—in a contract or in a
statute.22 Indeed, the issue arises precisely because no one can write such
rules. This is a familiar problem, but the law treats it differently in the
bankruptcy context. And for good reason. The noncontractible
uncertainty associated with ﬁnancial distress is a recurring characteristic
across all ﬁrms. Where every relationship of a certain type is incomplete
and requires judicial intervention upon the occurrence of the same event,

17. See Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 Yale
L.J. 1807, 1808 (1998) [hereinafter Schwartz, Contract Theory] (stating that bankruptcy
solves a coordination problem). Baird sometimes describes bankruptcy as a solution to the
collective action problem facing creditors racing after assets. E.g., Douglas G. Baird, Loss
Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 815,
827 (1987) [hereinafter Baird, Loss Distribution]. Subsequent scholarship has, however,
shown that bankruptcy reaches far beyond that problem. See infra section I.A.
18. See infra section II.A.
19. See Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 8, at 92–93 (noting that contracts
can be incomplete because of the costs associated with verifying to a court that a contingency
has occurred).
20. Hart & Moore, supra note 8, at 756 (describing the incomplete contract problem).
21. Oliver Hart, Incomplete Contracts and Control, 107 Am. Econ. Rev. 1731, 1733
(2017) (describing the hold-up problem); see also Hart & Moore, supra note 8, at 757
(describing issues of “lock-in” after the parties have made initial investments pursuant to a
contract).
22. See infra section II.A.2.
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a uniform bankruptcy system that deals with those relationships will
produce consistency, efficiency, and market predictability.23
The descriptive claim of this Article is that Chapter 11 is an attempt—
albeit an imprecise one—at such a system.24 It creates a renegotiation
framework designed to minimize the parties’ ability and incentives to hold
each other up. The framework imposes judicial oversight and substantive
outer limits on the parties’ decisions. It also allocates power over certain
decisions to one party while subjecting the exercise or removal of that
power to evidentiary burdens, pricing mechanisms, and other conditions
targeted at proving the absence of hold-up behavior. The initial allocation
of power and conditions is based on the perceived likelihood that the
decision in question is subject to incomplete contracting and hold-up
problems. In light of substantive uncertainty, the system relies mostly on
procedural protections, giving judges wide discretion to deﬁne the
bargaining parameters while leaving most substantive decisions to ex post
bargaining among the parties. In a sense, the law puts in place guardrails
that give the parties room to bargain while keeping them from taking
positions that veer toward extreme hold up.
Bankruptcy law, then, is not about mimicking a hypothetical bargain.
It is about facilitating an actual bargain. This is the New Bargaining Theory
of corporate bankruptcy stated generally. Consistent with this theory,
Chapter 11 implements a renegotiation framework to facilitate ex post
bargaining.25 This Article provides speciﬁcs on this theory and
demonstrates that questions of cramdown, executory contracts, forum
shopping, the automatic stay, third-party releases, intercreditor
agreements, priority rules, and the like can all be understood and
explained by a proper application of the New Bargaining Theory.
Two key features are worth highlighting now: First, ex post bargaining
is front and center. That is where bankruptcy law happens. To be clear,
the New Bargaining Theory does not reject the idea of ex ante efficiency.
An efficient bankruptcy system is focused on solving the ex post problem
if, but only if, it can do so without creating bigger problems in other states
of the world. This focus presents a meaningful limitation on the
implementation of any bankruptcy measure.26 Second, Chapter 11’s
renegotiation framework relies heavily on judicial discretion and
procedural measures that facilitate the ex post bargain.27 Substantive
measures—including value redistribution and deviations from
nonbankruptcy priority—do, however, come into play to facilitate the

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See infra section II.B.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
See infra sections II.C, III.C.
See infra section II.B.
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bargain by realigning incentives or minimizing distortions that might
otherwise occur.28
Notably, this Article does not claim that Chapter 11 operates
perfectly—judicial error and misaligned incentives do exist. But the New
Bargaining Theory coherently explains the major aspects of Chapter 11
and reveals the questions necessary to assess whether it achieves its
purpose. For example, it provides insight into Chapter 11’s proper scope.
Because the potential for hold up arises when parties have made
investments speciﬁc to relationships that involve or link in some way to the
going-concern value of the debtor,29 Chapter 11 should focus exclusively
on regulating ex post behavior that might take advantage of those
relationship-speciﬁc investments.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I explores the usefulness and
shortcomings of the Creditors’ Bargain Theory, the Butner Principle, and
other heuristics that have been used to describe the core purpose of
bankruptcy law. Part II provides the foundation for the New Bargaining
Theory of corporate bankruptcy. Part III describes Chapter 11’s
renegotiation framework. Part IV demonstrates the usefulness of this
emerging theory by applying it to current issues of debate in bankruptcy
law.
I. MOVING BEYOND THE CREDITORS’ BARGAIN
An interesting shift has happened in corporate bankruptcy
scholarship. Scholars widely and routinely invoke the Creditors’ Bargain
Theory and the Butner Principle as the foundational principles of
corporate bankruptcy,30 but virtually none of those scholars believe that
the theory or the principle is normatively or descriptively correct. Indeed,
most corporate bankruptcy scholars point to the Creditors’ Bargain
Theory and the Butner Principle as their analytical foundation, but they
then criticize aspects of the theory and proceed to build their analysis on

28. See infra Part III.
29. Going-concern value generally refers to the value derived from keeping an
enterprise together. See Baird & Rasmussen, End of Bankruptcy, supra note 3, at 758 (“We
have a going-concern surplus . . . only to the extent that there are assets that are worth more
if located within an existing ﬁrm. If all the assets can be used as well elsewhere, the ﬁrm has
no value as a going concern.”). Thus, a ﬁrm has positive going-concern value when the
whole of the business is worth more than the sum of its separate parts. Id. A ﬁrm without
going-concern value is one that should be liquidated because its assets can be put to more
valuable use elsewhere. See id.
30. See Douglas G. Baird, Priority Matters: Absolute Priority, Relative Priority, and the
Costs of Bankruptcy, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 785, 792 n.21 (2017) [hereinafter Baird, Priority
Matters] (“Framing the question as one about the hypothetical ex ante bargain among
investors has been the standard trope in reorganization scholarship ever since Jackson
introduced the creditors’ bargain model in the early 1980s.”); id. at 789 (noting the goal of
reorganization is to “respect the nonbankruptcy bargain among the investors”).
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a more generic efficiency foundation.31 The result is that when scholars
invoke the Creditors’ Bargain, they convey little more than a general
commitment to an efficiency analysis of bankruptcy.32
This Part reﬂects on the initial appeal of the Creditors’ Bargain
Theory and the Butner Principle and then identiﬁes their theoretical
shortcomings. While the Butner Principle is often referred to as a
quintessential part of the Creditors’ Bargain Theory,33 this Part attempts
to disentangle the two ideas. It argues that the Creditors’ Bargain Theory
was a useful analytical tool for demonstrating certain important principles
but never provided a complete theory to explain the purpose, reach, or
limitations of a corporate bankruptcy system. The Butner Principle, in
contrast, was at best a misunderstood shorthand for the idea that
bankruptcy law should be efficient and limited in scope. In application it
provides little guidance and instead draws scholars and courts to
misleading and circular inquiries.
Corporate bankruptcy scholars have also developed a series of
additional heuristics and rules of thumb to further explain or supplement
the Creditors’ Bargain Theory. The leading ones include the sole-owner
31. See, e.g., Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 12, at 1566 (invoking the Creditors’ Bargain
Theory but rejecting what they call the “Normative Butner Principle” and suggesting an
“Efficiency Principle” instead); Foohey, supra note 16, at 128–29 & n.5 (suggesting the
existing focus on efficiency gives too little consideration to issues of procedural justice);
Moringiello, supra note 12 , at 665 (criticizing some courts’ extension of the Butner Principle
to distributional questions); Randal C. Picker, Voluntary Petitions and the Creditors’
Bargain, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 519, 525–26 (1992) (noting general skepticism regarding the
Creditors’ Bargain Theory as a positive theory of bankruptcy law); Rasmussen, A Menu
Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, supra note 7, at 55–56 & n.7 (criticizing the Creditors’
Bargain Theory for overemphasizing the importance of nonbankruptcy entitlements); Mark
J. Roe & Frederick Tung, Breaking Bankruptcy Priority: How Rent-Seeking Upends the
Creditors’ Bargain, 99 Va. L. Rev. 1235, 1269 (2013) (noting that the Creditors’ Bargain
Theory does not match reality on the ground); Yaad Rotem, Pursuing Preservation of PreBankruptcy Entitlements: Corporate Bankruptcy Law’s Self-Executing Mechanisms, 5
Berkeley Bus. L.J. 79, 85–86 (2008) (emphasizing efficiency as a goal in preserving prebankruptcy entitlements and that “preservation is a second order goal”); Schwartz, Contract
Theory, supra note 17, at 1809–10 (arguing that bankruptcy is just about increasing
efficiency by solving a coordination problem); Scott, supra note 13, at 692 (“Nonetheless,
[the Creditors’ Bargain Theory] is only partially successful in rationalizing current
bankruptcy law.”).
Even Baird, one of the scholars who originally formulated the theory, has moved on
from its original content. See Baird & Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, supra note 3, at 652–53
(noting that actual bankruptcy practice is at odds with the Creditors’ Bargain Theory); Baird
& Rasmussen, End of Bankruptcy, supra note 3, at 755 (indicating that, because of economic
and investment changes since the nineteenth century, traditional conceptions of
bankruptcy law “no longer matter[] much”).
32. Notably, Professor Diane Lourdes Dick suggests that while efficiency is the general
goal of bankruptcy law and scholarship, the prevailing reliance on neoclassical and other
“outmoded” assumptions has doomed the enterprise to failure. Dick, Efficiency Fallacy,
supra note 15, at 823.
33. See, e.g., Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 12, at 1564–65 (referring to the Butner
Principle as the “second element” (of two) of the Creditors’ Bargain Theory).
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principle34 and the rule of general averages.35 These are useful for
understanding some aspects of the corporate bankruptcy system, but they
are not successful in stating a unifying theory. The following subsections
lay out the usefulness and limitations of the Creditors’ Bargain Theory, the
Butner Principle, and these other heuristics. But ﬁrst, a word about
collective action.
A.

The Collective Action Problem

Part I’s core claim is that the Creditors’ Bargain Theory provides
insufficient guidance in deriving a theory of corporate bankruptcy. It does
have demonstrative utility, however, if there is an accompanying external
theory of bankruptcy’s purpose.
One obvious candidate for that external theory is the collective action
problem. That is certainly where Professors Thomas Jackson and Douglas
Baird often looked.36 Indeed, one pushback on this Article’s critique
might be that the original Creditors’ Bargain Theory and the Butner
Principle are not purpose theories themselves but are necessary limitations
on a system that has a purpose of solving the collective action problem
among creditors.
There is a lot going on in that statement, but it can be broken into
two parts. First is the purpose deﬁnition. If one understands “collective
action” to encompass the broad array of ex post bargaining and
cooperation problems that arise from hold up associated with ﬁnancial
distress, then it is true that bankruptcy is aimed at solving that problem.
And this Article explains why bankruptcy law should pursue that purpose
and why the problem arises in the ﬁrst place. That is not, however, the way
that bankruptcy scholars deﬁne the “collective action problem.” The
existing literature cabins “collective action” to the narrow cooperation
problem of general creditors self-interestedly racing to execute their

34. The sole-owner principle suggests that the law should do what a single rational
owner would do. See Jackson, Logic and Limits, supra note 12, at 12–13; infra note 94 and
accompanying text.
35. The rule of general averages is borrowed from admiralty law and, in the bankruptcy
context, would dictate that stakeholders share costs and losses in proportion to the value of
their stake. Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay
on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors’ Bargain, 75 Va. L. Rev. 155, 171 (1989).
36. Baird, Loss Distribution, supra note 17, at 827 (“Jackson and I have asked why a
parallel debt collection system is desirable at all. The answer, we assert, is the collective
action problem.”); Douglas G. Baird & Randal C. Picker, A Simple Noncooperative
Bargaining Model of Corporate Reorganizations, 20 J. Legal Stud. 311, 311 (1991) (noting
the traditional view that creditors face a collective action problem); Jackson, A Retrospective
Look, supra note 11, at 1871 (“[The collective action problem] was, if you will, my ‘eureka’
moment. I could suddenly see a reason for a bankruptcy law apart from the fresh start for
the individual.”); see also Barry E. Adler, The Creditors’ Bargain Revisited, 166 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1853, 1853–54 (2018) [hereinafter Adler, Creditors’ Bargain Revisited] (describing
Jackson’s bargain theory as one about collective action).
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claims on a debtor’s assets.37 To this problem, the automatic stay is the
most direct response.38
But corporate bankruptcy is much more than that. Financial distress
presents a multitude of other ex post bargaining and cooperation
problems, which bankruptcy law addresses. For example, Professors Baird
and Randal Picker explain that distress presents a noncooperative
bargaining problem among senior and junior creditors that is distinct
from the “collective action problem.”39 They note that to solve the
bargaining problem, “[b]ankruptcy scholarship needs to go beyond
examining the collective action problem faced by the residual owners of
an insolvent ﬁrm.”40 Likewise, Professors Baird and Robert Rasmussen
describe bankruptcy’s ex post coordination problem among sophisticated
creditors as “quite at odds with the standard account” of the collective
action problem.41 More recently, Professor Barry Adler distinguishes freeand-clear sales—which themselves solve a very speciﬁc cooperation
problem42—from anything related to the “collective action problem.”43
37. See, e.g., Adler, Creditors’ Bargain Revisited, supra note 36, at 1855 (describing a
“potentially destructive creditor grab race” if a creditor “delayed its own action on the mere
hope that the creditor would . . . agree to act collectively”); Baird & Picker, supra note 36,
at 311–13, 322 (“The traditional view of bankruptcy law begins with the idea that diverse
general creditors of a ﬁrm face a collective action problem when their corporate debtor
becomes insolvent.”); David A. Skeel, Jr. & George Triantis, Bankruptcy’s Uneasy Shift to a
Contract Paradigm, 166 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1777, 1778 (2018) (describing the “race to the
courthouse” in response to ﬁnancial distress in which “creditors as a whole would suffer”).
38. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2018); see also infra section III.B.2.
39. Baird & Picker, supra note 36, at 311–13, 322.
40. Id. at 349.
41. Baird & Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, supra note 3, at 653. Professors David Skeel
and George Triantis have similarly concluded that collective action problems “are much less
pressing” today and solving them no longer forms the central objective of bankruptcy. Skeel
& Triantis, supra note 37, at 1817.
42. Free-and-clear sales, which are provided for in 11 U.S.C. § 363(f), allow a debtor to
sell some or all of its assets free of encumbrances. Thus, the buyer of the assets gets them
“free and clear” of the claims against those assets. The claims must be fulﬁlled from the
estate, which now consists of the proceeds of the sale. This solves the hold-up problem that
arises when less than all creditors agree to release their claims against a debtor even when
doing so would facilitate a value-maximizing sale. See infra text accompanying note 299.
43. Adler, Creditors’ Bargain Revisited, supra note 36, at 1864. Professor Alan Schwartz
goes even further, claiming that ﬁnancial distress does not present collective action
problems. He argues that bankruptcy law should therefore focus exclusively on facilitating
liquidity injections from creditors, preventing certain preferential or fraudulent transfers,
implementing voting rules for restructuring, and policing auctions for misbehavior. Alan
Schwartz, Bankruptcy Related Contracting and Bankruptcy Functions, in Research
Handbook on Corporate Bankruptcy Law 363, 384–85 (Barry E. Adler ed., 2020)
[hereinafter Schwartz, Contracting and Bankruptcy Functions]. Schwartz does not view any
of these functions as addressing a coordination problem. See id. at 379 (“[C]oordination
among creditors apparently is not a serious problem.”). But all of them involve legal
interventions to coordinate multiparty behavior and prevent opportunistic hold-up
behavior. Voting rules, for example, are inherently addressed at coordination and are
unnecessary where coordination is not a problem. The same is true of liquidity measures.
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Over the last three decades, bankruptcy law and scholarship have thus
moved far beyond the idea of just solving a race to assets among general
creditors.44 Today’s bankruptcy debates focus on more complex
bargaining and cooperation problems.45
Second, the statement above suggests a role for the Creditors’ Bargain
Theory and the Butner Principle in setting a limit on any bankruptcy
theory. But, for reasons the next subsection states, the Creditors’ Bargain
Theory and the Butner Principle do not add meaningful limitations to any
bankruptcy theory. The Creditors’ Bargain model merely states that
bankruptcy’s purpose (whatever it is) should be efficient, and the Butner
Principle merely states that this purpose should be its own limitation.
B.

The Creditors’ Bargain Theory

It is difficult today to separate the Butner Principle from the Creditors’
Bargain Theory. They are often coupled together in bankruptcy law and
scholarship, but they are distinct concepts.46 The Creditors’ Bargain
Theory is a model whereby one “view[s] bankruptcy as a system designed
to mirror the agreement one would expect the creditors to form among
themselves were they able to negotiate such an agreement from an ex ante

See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 12, at 1561, 1576. And preferences and auction misbehavior
are forms of hold-up behavior that arise when traditional contracting cannot prevent them.
As such, all of these functions ﬁt squarely within the New Bargaining Theory of bankruptcy.
Finally, Schwartz does not explain why bankruptcy law should focus on these coordination
problems and not others beyond noting the preferences of creditors who lobbied for the
1898 and 1938 bankruptcy laws. Schwartz, Contracting and Bankruptcy Functions, supra, at
364. The theory Part II presents suggests that bankruptcy law should address all bargaining
and cooperation problems arising from incomplete contracts, not just the ones historically
favored by creditors.
44. Douglas G. Baird, Arturo Bris & Ning Zhu, The Dynamics of Large and Small
Chapter 11 Cases: An Empirical Study 5, 33 (Int’l Ctr. for Fin. at Yale Sch. of Mgmt., Working
Paper No. 05-29, 2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=866865 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review) [hereinafter Baird et al., Chapter 11 Dynamics] (noting that most large business
bankruptcies today are processes by which large institutional lenders—not ordinary general
creditors—reach a deal with each other or effect a sale of the ﬁrm’s assets and ﬁnding that
typical small business bankruptcies do “nothing or close to nothing for ordinary general
creditors”).
45. See, e.g., Kenneth Ayotte, Anthony J. Casey & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy on
the Side, 112 Nw. U. L. Rev. 255, 257–58 (2017) (modeling ex ante and ex post bargaining
involved with intercreditor agreements); Kenneth Ayotte, Disagreement and Capital
Structure Complexity, 49 J. Legal Stud. 1, 28–29 (2020) [hereinafter Ayotte, Disagreement]
(modeling bargaining and cooperation among creditors who are part of a complex capital
structure); Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Quiet Revolution, 91 Am. Bankr. L.J. 593, 593–
95 (2017) (examining the rise and bargaining dynamics of restructuring support
agreements among stakeholders); Dick, Efficiency Fallacy, supra note 15, at 765 (examining
negotiation and rent extraction in Chapter 11); Skeel & Triantis, supra note 37, at 1781–83
(noting the tension between ex ante and ex post bargaining in bankruptcy law).
46. See supra note 33.
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position.”47 The Butner Principle, in its most commonly cited form,
provides that bankruptcy law should give special deference to—and avoid
interfering with—entitlements and rights that are created by
nonbankruptcy law.48
Nothing about the Creditors’ Bargain Theory necessitates the Butner
Principle. Nor is the Butner Principle helpful in understanding a
hypothetical ex ante agreement among creditors. For this reason, this
Article will refer to it as the “Butner Fallacy.” Nonetheless, the Butner
Fallacy has repeatedly been justiﬁed as a quintessential element of the
Creditors’ Bargain Theory.49 Indeed, the ﬁrst articulation of the Creditors’
Bargain Theory focused almost exclusively on explaining and justifying
bankruptcy law’s “substantial respect to non-bankruptcy entitlements.”50
But—because they are separate concepts—this section will start by
bracketing the Butner Fallacy and instead will explore the utility and
limitations of the Creditors’ Bargain Theory.
1. Demonstrative Utility. — The Creditors’ Bargain model is useful in
two ways. First, it helps demonstrate ﬁnancial concepts and efficiency
dynamics. Second, it provides rhetorical justiﬁcation for bankruptcy law’s
interference with private ordering.
Starting with the ﬁnancial concepts, the model demonstrates that ex
post legal interventions will be priced into and can affect ex ante
bargaining. In this way, a creditor who beneﬁts from a legal intervention
that redistributes ex post value may actually be worse off in other states of
the world. For example, the Creditors’ Bargain is often invoked for the
following idea: Imagine all creditors bargaining with full information over
the rules that will apply in bankruptcy. One can predict that they will ﬁrst
bargain for rules that expand the pie the most and then they will agree on
prices and other methods to divide the surplus created by the expansion.51
Another corollary prediction is that if one creditor proposes a rule that

47. Jackson, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements and the Creditors’ Bargain, supra note 3,
at 860.
48. See, e.g., Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 12, at 1564–65 (“The second element of the
Creditors’ Bargain theory is the claim that resolution of common-pool problems . . .
typically does not require altering the substantive values of those rights as established by
nonbankruptcy law.”); Baird & Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations, supra note 12, at 100
(stating that “[b]ankruptcy law should change a substantive nonbankruptcy rule only when
doing so preserves the value of assets for the group of investors holding rights in them”);
Jackson, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements and the Creditors’ Bargain, supra note 3, at 859
(providing that bankruptcy law “to date accord[s] substantial respect to non-bankruptcy
entitlements”).
49. See supra note 12.
50. Jackson, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements and the Creditors’ Bargain, supra note 3,
at 859.
51. See id. at 860–68 (describing the various incentives at play in the hypothetical
bargain).
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will increase their share of the bankruptcy estate, other creditors will
charge them an ex ante fee to offset that ex post distribution.52
This is a salient version of a more complicated point: Among
sophisticated rational actors, initial investment decisions and prices take
into account expectations about ultimate returns. If a legal change reduces
the expected payout for a creditor in bankruptcy, that creditor will charge
a higher interest rate up front.53 But because all creditors take expected
returns into account,54 legal rules that merely alter distributions among
creditors without otherwise changing the size of the pie do not affect the
ﬁrm’s value.55 The creditor who is favored (in expectation) by a rule that
applies in bankruptcy will charge a lower interest rate, the creditor who is
disfavored by the rule will charge a higher interest rate, and the debtor will

52. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Priority of Secured
Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 Yale L.J. 857, 881 (1996) (“Thus, Bank and Firm would never
adopt an inefficient security interest in order to divert value from other creditors . . . [who]
would simply respond by raising their interest rates to recover the value diverted, leaving
Bank and Firm to bear the net efficiency costs associated with the inefficient security
interest.”).
53. Id.
54. Later work criticized this assumption of the Creditors’ Bargain Theory by pointing
out that some creditors may not be able to adjust interest rates to account for expected
returns. See Baird, World Without Bankruptcy, supra note 1, at 180 (noting that tort victims
cannot adjust interest rates); Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 52, at 895–902 (modeling the
problems nonadjusting creditors pose for the Creditors’ Bargain Theory); Richard Squire,
The Case for Symmetry in Creditors’ Rights, 118 Yale L.J. 806, 808–09 (2009) (showing how
value can be extracted from nonadjusting creditors); Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, Contracting Out of Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention, 118 Harv. L. Rev.
1197, 1203 (2005) (“We document the presence of substantial numbers of creditors who
have little meaningful opportunity to negotiate with their debtors or adjust their prices to
reﬂect risks.”). These nonadjusting or maladjusting creditors receive the same interest rate
regardless of their expected payouts in bankruptcy. Tort victims are the most obvious group
of nonadjusting creditors, but some think employees and small vendors may also belong to
this category. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 52, at 908 (listing categories of easily
identiﬁable nonadjusting creditors). Regulatory creditors may also fall into this category.
See Joshua Macey & Jackson Salovaara, Bankruptcy as Bailout: Coal Company Insolvency
and the Erosion of Federal Law, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 879, 887 (2019) (showing that coal
companies’ “ability to siphon off regulatory obligations” has allowed them to provide belowmarket returns to regulatory creditors). Virtually everyone agrees that the problem of
nonadjusting creditors requires separate attention—and perhaps separate treatment—in
bankruptcy. There is disagreement, however, about the size of the problem in most cases.
See Baird et al., Chapter 11 Dynamics, supra note 44, at 33 (ﬁnding that Chapter 11
bankruptcy proceedings have little to do with the rights of nonadjusting creditors).
Compare Warren & Westbrook, supra, at 1235–39 (ﬁnding the problem to be large), with
Robert K. Rasmussen, Empirically Bankrupt, 2007 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 179, 181–84 (2007)
(questioning Warren and Westbrook’s results).
55. This all follows from the Modigliani–Miller theorem. Franco Modigliani & Merton
H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 Am.
Econ. Rev. 261, 268, 288–96 (1958) (explaining that in the absence of tax costs and other
market imperfections, “the market value of any ﬁrm is independent of its capital structure”).
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face the same cost of capital.56 No value is lost, and everyone ends up in
the same (expected) position. In designing the system, only the rules that
increase or decrease the size of the pie should be relevant, not those that
change how the parties divide it.
The takeaway is that the only changes that matter are those that create
or eliminate inefficiencies. Thus, a distribution rule that also distorted the
incentives of those running the business would matter. For example, a
bankruptcy rule that inﬂates distributions to management could cause
managers to inefficiently expend resources in order to cause a bankruptcy
ﬁling.57 That rule would reduce the value of the ﬁrm and constrain its ex
ante ability to raise capital.58 By focusing attention on a hypothetical ex
ante bargain, the model highlights this important interaction between ex
post and ex ante efficiency.
The Creditors’ Bargain model can also provide rhetorical justiﬁcation
for the perhaps controversial idea that bankruptcy law should interfere
with private ordering to achieve its efficiency goal. The rhetorical move is
to tie the efficiency goal to the ideal private order. The Creditors’ Bargain
Theory frames bankruptcy law not as interfering with private ordering but
as vindicating the order that creditors would agree to if they privately
bargained over it.59
There is not much substance there,60 but the rhetoric is important.
The idea is that bankruptcy law provides a set of rules that interferes with
private rights, but only when those private rights are misﬁring. If
bankruptcy law does that efficiently, the bargain model points out that the
creditors can allocate any beneﬁts achieved by adjusting their ex ante
prices.61 Thus, while bankruptcy law is—at its core—a federal law that

56. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 52, at 881 (explaining how creditors can adjust
interest rates in response to distribution rules); Modigliani & Miller, supra note 55, at 268.
57. See Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 Yale L.J. 573, 592
(1998) [hereinafter Baird, Uncontested Axioms] (explaining that with special payouts and
rules in bankruptcy, “parties will behave strategically and waste resources searching out the
place where they will receive the most favorable treatment”).
58. See Barry E. Adler, Game-Theoretic Bankruptcy Valuation, 41 J. Legal Stud. 209,
214 (2012) (noting that reducing creditor payouts in bankruptcy raises the ex ante cost of
capital for debtors).
59. See, e.g., Rizwaan Jameel Mokal, The Authentic Consent Model: Contractarianism,
Creditors’ Bargain, and Corporate Liquidation, 21 Legal Stud. 400, 410 (2001) (noting that
the bargain model is a rhetorical argument to justify implied consent by arguing that the
parties would have agreed to it if asked).
60. Professor David Carlson has similarly—though more critically—labeled the model
as merely rhetorical. David Gray Carlson, Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1341,
1342 (1987).
61. See supra note 52.
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intervenes in state law and private ordering among creditors,62 the model
shows that the beneﬁts of that intervention run to those same creditors.
In this way, the Creditors’ Bargain model was useful in explaining why
creditors should not object in principle to a paternalistic attempt to solve
their coordination problem. But—as the next section discusses—it neither
explains why bankruptcy law focuses on solving that particular problem
and not others nor describes how it should do so.
2. Limitations: Purpose and Scope. — Despite its demonstrative utility,
the Creditors’ Bargain model is not a complete theory of bankruptcy.
While it illustrates a generic efficiency argument for maximizing the
welfare of stakeholders, the model of an ex ante agreement among
creditors proves both unnecessary and unhelpful in deﬁning the substance
and scope of that welfare-maximizing purpose.
As noted, the model helps to justify government intervention by
demonstrating why creditors would prefer a law that is efficient—they
prefer to take their slices from a larger pie.63 But any model starting with
rational actors who enter an agreement in a world of perfect information
and no transaction costs will arrive inescapably at the solution that
maximizes the welfare of those rational actors.64 That is a mere nod toward
the goal of welfare-maximizing efficiency.65
And yet even if one embraces the efficiency purpose as given—which
this Article does66—one still has to answer fundamental questions about
whose welfare is being maximized and within what parameters. For
starters, why should bankruptcy law focus on the value of claims against
the debtor’s assets67 but not the nonclaim interests of those affected by the
debtor’s business or even total outsiders? This question has divided

62. See Anthony J. Casey, Bankruptcy’s Endowment Effect, 33 Emory Bankr. Devs. J.
141, 156 (2016) [hereinafter Casey, Bankruptcy’s Endowment Effect] (noting that
bankruptcy alters private ordering to achieve its purpose).
63. See supra section I.B.1.
64. This is really just the Coase Theorem. Without transaction costs, bargaining will
lead to the socially efficient outcome. Coase, supra note 5, at 15. When transaction costs do
exist, the law may need to step in to achieve efficiency. See id. at 16–19 (describing instances
in which a legal system that interferes with market transactions can lead to economic
efficiency).
65. Similarly, in the more general law-and-economics context, independent of
bankruptcy, others have pointed out that hypothetical contracts frameworks do not add
anything to general ideas of efficiency. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs 169
(1992) (“[T]here appears to be nothing expressed by the concept of hypothetical consent
that is not already captured in the idea of rational self-interest.”).
66. Consistent with most law-and-economics approaches, this Article embraces the idea
of maximizing welfare. The primary goal is to propose a workable welfarist theory. The
Article does not undertake here a more fundamental defense of the general law-andeconomics welfarist approach.
67. Baird and Jackson use the word “creditors” to encompass all those with claims
against the debtor’s estate. See Jackson, A Retrospective Look, supra note 11, at 1872 (“In
retrospect, I might have better labeled it a ‘claimants’ bargain’ or something broader.”).
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bankruptcy scholars for years.68 The Creditors’ Bargain model avoids the
question by assumption: If the purpose is to mirror a creditors’ bargain,
then the creditors are the focus.
But why not mirror an ideal bargain between all affected parties? If
bankruptcy is supposed to solve an ex ante bargaining problem among
creditors, why shouldn’t it solve other ex ante bargaining problems related
to a debtor’s distress? If there is a bargain that includes all possible
creditors, one could imagine a bargain that includes employees,
consumers, and communities with an interest (or the possibility of an
interest) in the long-term success (or failure) of the debtor ﬁrm. And that
bargain could take into account all of their interests, even those that do
not take the form of a claim against assets—a consumer’s interest in cheap
goods, a local government’s interest in tax revenue, a stakeholder’s
interest in maximizing its other investments in competing ﬁrms, any
interest affected by any externality of the ﬁrm’s actions.69 As long as
transaction costs are zero, all parties can reach an imagined bargain that
includes enough transfer payments for an efficient outcome that
maximizes the value of their interests.
But if one does not intend for bankruptcy to implement a theory of
general welfare, then one needs to deﬁne a concrete purpose for the
system and then develop a partition to limit the scope of actions taken to
achieve that purpose.70 One has to deﬁne what is—for lack of a better
term—bankruptcy stuff and what is not.
The Creditors’ Bargain model fails at drawing this partition as a
descriptive and normative matter. Descriptively, the model is misleading.71
It identiﬁes only the claims against the estate as bankruptcy stuff when
many corporate bankruptcy systems in the world draw the partition more
broadly than that.72 Normatively, the model never explains why one should
68. See, e.g., Donald R. Korobkin, Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations
of Bankruptcy Law, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 541, 572–75 (1993) (arguing for an approach to the
Creditors’ Bargain that includes all affected parties).
69. Some argue that bankruptcy law already accounts for these interests. See, e.g.,
Samuel L. Bufford, What Is Right About Bankruptcy Law and Wrong About Its Critics, 72
Wash. U. L.Q. 829, 838 (1994) (noting that Chapter 11 protects jobs, communities, and
economic values); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775, 787–88
(1987) (arguing that Congress intended that bankruptcy law serve broader interests such as
protecting jobs and serving the interests of customers, nearby property owners,
municipalities, and others). Others have suggested expanding bankruptcy’s scope to do so
more explicitly. See, e.g., Mann, supra note 12, at 1000 (suggesting that value created by the
bankruptcy process could be distributed to further other government interests).
70. On the importance of and challenges in drawing this partition, see Douglas G.
Baird, Anthony J. Casey & Randal C. Picker, The Bankruptcy Partition, 166 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1675, 1677 (2018) [hereinafter Baird et al., Bankruptcy Partition]; see also Vincent S.J.
Buccola, The Bankruptcy Firm, 167 U. Pa. L. Rev. Online 1, 6 (2019) (discussing the
difficulties in drawing the partition around bankruptcy law matters).
71. See sources cited supra note 31.
72. See Baird et al., Bankruptcy Partition, supra note 70, at 1684–86 (demonstrating
the ways in which bankruptcy power reaches beyond merely resolving claims against the
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draw the partition where it does nor why the law should focus on the
interests of claimants and not the interests of anyone who has a nonclaim
interest affected by the debtor. And without coherent normative vision,
there is no theory. This deﬁciency of theory manifests itself regularly in
debates about whether new disputes—like third-party releases—fall within
or without bankruptcy’s partition.73
No doubt, many readers familiar with the Creditors’ Bargain
literature are objecting at this point. Surely, they will say, the Creditors’
Bargain Theory does show where and why to draw the partition: The goal
is to maximize the value not of generic interests in the world but of
nonbankruptcy entitlements against the debtor.74 And bankruptcy law
must do so in the way that least interferes with those entitlements. And the
reason for doing so? That raises the Butner Fallacy.
C.

The Butner Fallacy

Lacking a purpose and a limiting principle, the Creditors’ Bargain
model spawned a specious scope limitation that is often mistaken for a
core purpose. For nearly four decades, the Creditors’ Bargain model—
beyond stating the generic efficiency principle—has focused on the
question of preserving and protecting substantive rights that exist outside
of the bankruptcy system.75 The idea takes its name from Butner v. United
States76 (which, incidentally, does not actually require that bankruptcy law
provide any special respect for nonbankruptcy substantive rights).77
The assumption that connects the Creditors’ Bargain Theory to the
Butner Fallacy is that creditors would—if they could—bargain for rules that
estate). The same is true of corporate insolvency systems around the world. See, e.g., Horst
Eidenmüller, Comparative Corporate Insolvency Law, in The Oxford Handbook of
Corporate Law and Governance 1003, 1012 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds.,
2018) (“[T]here are jurisdictions that entertain a policy according to which insolvency law
should serve not only creditors’ but also other stakeholders’ interests, for example those of
the debtor, workers, and the (local) community.”).
73. See Baird et al., Bankruptcy Partition, supra note 70, at 1686–90 (discussing the
split in authority about whether and when a bankruptcy court has the power to issue thirdparty releases).
74. Jackson & Scott, supra note 35, at 155 (noting that the “cornerstone” of the
Creditors’ Bargain is “to maximize net asset distributions to the creditors”).
75. See supra note 12.
76. 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
77. See supra note 11. Far from suggesting that bankruptcy law should not interfere
with nonbankruptcy rights, the Court in Butner explicitly stated that the Bankruptcy Clause
of the Constitution granted Congress the authority to alter nonbankruptcy rights: “The
constitutional authority of Congress to establish ‘uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States’ would clearly encompass a federal statute
deﬁning the mortgagee’s interest in the rents and proﬁts earned by property in a bankrupt
estate.” Butner, 440 U.S. at 54 (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4). It was only because the
Bankruptcy Code was silent on the matter that the Court deferred to state law. See id. at 55.
This is a familiar interpretive move whereby the Court does not lightly presume that
Congress has interfered with or preempted state law. Id. at 57–58.
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vindicate their substantive ex ante entitlements. Thus, according to some
versions of the Butner Fallacy, ex post bankruptcy laws can only reach
matters that preserve those ex ante entitlements.78
This is both circular and wrong. It is circular—or at least selfcontradicting—because it relies on nonbankruptcy entitlements to
determine when the law should interfere with nonbankruptcy entitlements. The theory imagines a bargain where the parties are writing rules
for what to do when their nonbankruptcy agreements are misﬁring. Then,
to limit the scope of those rules, the nonbankruptcy agreements must be
respected as much as possible. So when should those nonbankruptcy rights
be supplanted? When doing so will vindicate the nonbankruptcy rights.
But, then, which nonbankruptcy rights are vindicated and which are
supplanted?
The problem in answering these questions is that the corporate
bankruptcy system is a system of laws that suspends, eradicates, or
otherwise interferes with substantive rights that would exist outside of
bankruptcy. This is true of virtually every key provision of the Bankruptcy
Code.79 The automatic stay prevents the enforcement of contracts.80 The
cramdown provisions prevent a secured creditor from foreclosing on its
collateral.81 The sale provisions allow the sale of assets free and clear of
interests that would otherwise attach to the assets.82 The contractassumption provisions allow a debtor to enforce contracts where it would
otherwise be in default.83
Thus, the Butner Fallacy is a prescription that bankruptcy law should
not interfere with nonbankruptcy entitlements unless it should. As
Professor Juliet Moringiello has pointed out, in this framing the principle
has no content.84 The idea parses out to an admonition that bankruptcy
law controls substantive rights only when it serves a bankruptcy purpose.
This does nothing more than highlight the idea that bankruptcy law
should have a purpose.
D. The Creditors’ Bargain and the Butner Fallacy as Distractions
The Creditors’ Bargain and the Butner Fallacy tend to distract scholars
and lawyers by directing their attention to the wrong data and the wrong
78. See, e.g., Jacoby & Janger, Tracing Equity, supra note 12, at 676 (arguing that
bankruptcy law is derived from nonbankruptcy entitlements); Mooney, supra note 12, at
934 (arguing that bankruptcy law exists to serve nonbankruptcy entitlements).
79. And this is equally true of many key provisions of corporate insolvency laws in other
countries. See Eidenmüller, supra note 72, at 1012.
80. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2018).
81. Id. § 1129(b).
82. Id. § 363(f).
83. Id. § 365.
84. See Moringiello, supra note 12, at 659 (“[T]he Butner . . . caveat ‘unless some
federal interest requires otherwise’ swallows the rule as far as the treatment of property
rights inside of bankruptcy is concerned.”).
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solutions. As a result, much time is spent trying to design bankruptcy policy
to match “real-world” agreements or design bankruptcy reforms targeted
at facilitating ex ante communications. This section addresses these two
distractions.
1. The False Promise of “Real-World” Agreements. — A common move
among judges, scholars, and lawyers is to justify (or refute) bankruptcy
outcomes by pointing to evidence of real-world agreements that match (or
contradict) the proposed outcome.85 They suggest that the Creditors’
Bargain model cannot be satisﬁed unless creditors are seen adopting such
rules in the real world.86 How, they ask, can it be said that parties would
bargain for something when their actual bargain produces the opposite?
This misses the point. According to the Creditors’ Bargain Theory,
parties bargain in a world in which it is already stipulated that they cannot
bargain efficiently to their desired outcome, and they bargain in the
shadow of a mandatory bankruptcy system that forces a hypothetical
bargain on them to protect them from their own bad bargain.87 That
reveals little about what they would choose if they were rationally designing
a system in a perfect world.
Instead, the question is: What is the efficient rule? Or, in bargaining
terms, what is the rule that would have resulted from a pristine bargain
that exists nowhere in the world? The fact that creditors in the real world
act strategically and possess incomplete and asymmetric information
should surprise no one. Their actual agreements and their stated
preferences are, therefore, poor evidence of the rules that they should
adopt to ﬁx contracting failures among them.
2. Trying to Solve the Wrong Problem. — The Creditors’ Bargain Theory
also misleads because it entices scholars to think that bankruptcy’s
problems are solvable by facilitating communication to make an explicit
ex ante bargain possible. For example, some have proposed that helping
debtors adopt custom-made bankruptcy rules that are transparent to

85. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler & George Triantis, Debt Priority and Options in
Bankruptcy: A Policy Intervention, 91 Am. Bankr. L.J. 563, 583 (2017) (deriving bankruptcy
option value from the terms of loan agreements); see also Jacoby & Janger, Ice Cube Bonds,
supra note 12, at 892 (deriving optimal bankruptcy rules from distributional rights that the
parties have bargained for outside of bankruptcy); Jacoby & Janger, Tracing Equity, supra
note 12, at 680 (rejecting bankruptcy rules because they are based on priority rights that
cannot be created through real-world agreements under nonbankruptcy law).
86. See, e.g., Adler & Triantis, supra note 85, at 584 (looking to “real world” debt
contracts as evidence of optimal bankruptcy rules); Schwartz, Contracting and Bankruptcy
Functions, supra note 43, at 364, 383–84 (providing a normative analysis of bankruptcy law
by looking to private covenants).
87. See Anthony J. Casey & Edward R. Morrison, Beyond Options, in Research
Handbook on Corporate Bankruptcy Law 193, 195–98 (Barry E. Adler ed., 2020)
(describing how “bankruptcy forc[es] creditors to forbear their rights and enter a collective
bargaining process” to mirror an agreement “that maximizes collective value”).
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counterparties and affected parties would solve the bargaining problem.88
This transparency would allow the law to infer contractual assent much
like it does with mortgages and security interests.
But the real problem lies beyond the creditors’ logistical ability to
bargain with each other. As recent scholarship has pointed out, even small
numbers of creditors in an explicit bargain will write incomplete contracts
that produce inefficient results when ﬁnancial distress arises.89 The real
problem stems from uncertainty about and complexity in the distressed
state of the world. By its very nature, ﬁnancial distress is hard to contract
over; the relevant contingencies often cannot be enforced because they
turn on private information about asset values and volatility that are
impossible to verify to a court.90 The time horizon, the number of parties,
their incentives to bargain strategically, and the sheer number of contingencies also render the possible scenarios too numerous to deﬁne and
negotiate.91 Moreover, the dynamic nature of markets in distress requires
ﬂexibility that would be stiﬂed by hard-edged ex ante rules.92

88. See sources cited supra note 7; see also Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political
Theories of American Bankruptcy, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 311, 322–23 (1993) [hereinafter Adler,
Financial and Political Theories] (examining investor choice proposals); Schwartz, Contract
Theory, supra note 17, at 1811–12, 1833–39 (arguing generally for rules that facilitate
private contracting); Skeel & Triantis, supra note 37, at 1817 (urging bankruptcy law to take
ex ante contracting more seriously).
89. Professor Kenneth Ayotte’s work is the most groundbreaking on this issue. See
Kenneth Ayotte, On the Mandatory Stay of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, in Research
Handbook on Corporate Bankruptcy Law 150, 158 (Barry E. Adler ed., 2020) [hereinafter
Ayotte, Mandatory Stay of Secured Creditors] (“Under incomplete information, the
bargaining game is slightly more complicated and can result in inefficient continuation and
liquidation.”); see also Ayotte et al., supra note 45, at 261 (“These side agreements, though
proﬁtable for the parties to the agreement, can shut down opportunities in the bankruptcy
proceeding for one or more parties to strike efficiency-enhancing deals to defect.”).
90. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
91. See Jackson & Scott, supra note 35, at 166 (1989) (“[T]he creditors’ bargain of
necessity involves long-term relationships in which many of the contingencies that inﬂuence
business prospects are uncertain and highly interactive.”); see also Baird & Rasmussen,
Antibankruptcy, supra note 3, at 652 (“In short, the new world of corporate reorganizations
has more heterogeneous creditors whose rights against the business are deeply fragmented.”).
92. The same can be said about attempts to regulate bailouts and other government
action in times of systemic ﬁnancial distress. See Anthony J. Casey & Eric A. Posner, A
Framework for Bailout Regulation, 91 Notre Dame L. Rev. 479, 536 (2015) (“The paradox
of bailout regulation is that because the conditions under which bailouts are issued are
unpredictable, it is impossible to set up an ex ante insurance system to govern all such
conditions.”); see also Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law
Can Address the Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 75, 93–96 (2013)
(describing the challenges with ex ante ﬁnancial regulation in preventing failures due to
“interactive complexity” and “tight coupling” of the ﬁnancial system); Jeffrey Manns,
Building Better Bailouts: The Case for a Long-Term Investment Approach, 63 Fla. L. Rev.
1349, 1356–57 (2011) (describing the “amorphousness” of what constitutes a bailout and
its proper scope).
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As Part II shows, bankruptcy law responds to this incomplete
contracting problem,93 which cannot be solved by facilitating private
contracts and ex ante bargains, or by adopting technology that allows
dispersed creditors to express assent to a speciﬁc substantive bankruptcy
regime.
E.

Other Incomplete Heuristics

Over the years, the academy has produced other heuristics to explain
or supplement the Creditors’ Bargain Theory. The most prominent is the
sole-owner principle.94 Like the hypothetical bargain, this is another way
of demonstrating the importance of efficiency. A principle envisioning a
rational sole owner making decisions—instead of a group of creditors
costlessly bargaining—leads again inevitably to an efficient outcome that
maximizes the value of all assumed interests. Rational owners maximize
the value of the things they own.
But this raises, once again, the thorny question of scope: Sole owner
of what? The legal entity? The economic enterprise? All stakes? All
interests? The community and market as a whole?
Moreover, the question in bankruptcy is how to solve a bargaining
problem that arises with hold-up threats during ﬁnancial distress.95 But a
single owner won’t have anyone with whom to bargain, and so it makes
little sense to ask what that owner would do to solve the problem.
One might instead ask what substantive rule the single owner would
follow. But when the owner is uncertain about ﬁnancial distress, they
cannot specify a substantive rule ex ante.96 Instead, what is necessary are
procedural rules that move the parties’ ex post bargaining decisions
toward the correct substantive choice—which the court cannot verify.97 No
single owner would bother considering the content of such procedural
rules.
Another popular heuristic is the rule of general averages.98 This
heuristic is sometimes used to expand or enhance the Creditors’ Bargain
93. See infra sections II.A–.B.
94. See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 12, at 1563 (identifying the ﬁrst element of the
Creditors’ Bargain theory as one where “the ideal bankruptcy outcome is the one that would
be chosen by a sole owner”); Baird, Uncontested Axioms, supra note 57, at 582 (explaining
bankruptcy’s purpose as asking “what someone would do if that person were the ﬁrm’s sole
owner”); Baird & Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations, supra note 12, at 110 (analyzing
bankruptcy problems through a sole owner framework); Jackson, Logic and Limits, supra
note 12, at 12 (explaining the sole owner view of bankruptcy); Skeel & Triantis, supra note
37, at 1778 (“As Baird and Jackson envisioned it, the hypothetical contract would pursue a
‘sole owner’ standard.”).
95. See infra section II.A.
96. See infra section II.A.2.
97. See infra sections II.A–.B.
98. Jackson & Scott, supra note 35, at 171–73 (describing the rule of general averages);
Scott, supra note 13, at 700 (“An analogy to the law of admiralty, in particular the law of
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Theory by explaining why the creditors might agree to share risk when
distress arrives.99 Comparing the bankrupt debtor to a ship foundering at
sea, the idea is that bankruptcy law might follow admiralty law’s rule that
all stakeholders “contribute thereafter to the general average expense
according to their percentage of ownership.”100
This adds two aspects to the Creditors’ Bargain Theory. First, it
introduces the important idea of uncertainty. And second, it introduces
agency costs. Because the captain of a foundering ship will be making
decisions for the beneﬁt of others in an uncertain environment, the best
the law can do is align incentives to “dissipate the captain’s conﬂict
between self-interest and duty at the moment of sacriﬁce.”101 So too might
the law of bankruptcy create rules to dissipate the debtor’s conﬂict.
This framing generally resembles the bankruptcy problem. Faced with
uncertainty, the law wants to give ex post agents the right incentives. But
no one has shown that general average contribution is the best way to do
that. Nor is general average contribution a common method deployed as
a solution by actual bankruptcy laws.102
Doubtless there are other analogies that one could draw. Indeed, any
comparison to an area of the law that deals with ex ante regulation of ex
post discretion is likely to resemble a generic description of the bankruptcy
problem.103 The key, however, is to move from these generic heuristics and
analogies to a fuller theory describing the speciﬁc problems and solutions
as they actually arise in corporate bankruptcy.
II. DISCOVERING THE NEW BARGAINING THEORY OF CORPORATE
BANKRUPTCY
The New Bargaining Theory provides that bankruptcy law’s purpose
is to minimize the value destroyed by the incomplete contracting problem
general average, may provide insights into an underlying risk-sharing theme in bankruptcy
law.”).
99. Jackson & Scott, supra note 35, at 156–57.
100. Id. at 171.
101. Scott, supra note 13, at 701.
102. See infra sections III.C; see also David A. Skeel, Jr., The Empty Idea of “Equality of
Creditors,” 166 U. Pa. L. Rev. 699, 701 (2018) [hereinafter Skeel, The Empty Idea of
“Equality of Creditors”] (noting that equal contribution and recovery is not the practice on
the ground and that “[b]ankruptcy courts often bless arrangements that give one group of
general creditors starkly different treatment than other groups”). The prevalence of
secured debt and priority further detracts from any claims that Chapter 11 implements a
rule of general averages.
103. Bailout literature comes ﬁrst to mind. See supra note 92. Analogies to the famous
Alaska Packers case and the renegotiation of contracts under duress would also work. Alaska
Packers’ Ass’n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902). Professor Vincent Buccola has
recently suggested a similar analogy between bankruptcy and tort law’s private necessity
doctrine from Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (1910). Vincent S.J. Buccola,
Bankruptcy’s Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Distress, 114 Nw. U. L. Rev.
705, 723–25 (2019).
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that parties face with regard to ﬁnancial distress. Chapter 11 attempts to
do this, if imperfectly, by facilitating a structured bargaining space where
the relevant parties renegotiate their relationship. That bargaining space
constrains the parties procedurally and substantively in ways that are
targeted at minimizing their ability and incentive to hold each other up by
deviating from the welfare maximizing course of action.
The reason an entire ﬁeld of law exists to address this problem—
rather than the application of something like routine contract law—is the
ubiquity of the problem. An overwhelming majority of business
relationships suffer from the same incomplete contracting problem at the
moment ﬁnancial distress arises.104 As a result, a system of uniform
procedures has arisen to deal with the value destruction associated with
that problem. Indeed, if one imagines a world without bankruptcy law105
or observes ﬁnancial markets that exist in jurisdictions without a
functioning bankruptcy system, it is not surprising that the incomplete
contracting problem would produce pressures requiring a judicial or
legislative solution.106
Recognizing bankruptcy law’s purpose also sheds light on the scope
of a proper bankruptcy system. Bankruptcy law is targeted speciﬁcally at
solving hold-up problems related to the incomplete contracting problem
that arises with ﬁnancial distress. This means that bankruptcy law will seek
to address ex post behavior that opportunistically uses incompleteness to
extract value. Parties are vulnerable to hold up when they have made

104. Baird & Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, supra note 3, at 698 (concluding that with
newer ﬁnancial innovation, agreements among creditors are likely to be incomplete);
Jackson & Scott, supra note 35, at 166 (noting that risk-sharing agreements involve longterm relationships and many uncertain and interactive contingencies).
105. See Baird, World Without Bankruptcy, supra note 1, at 184 (noting that creditors
would self-interestedly destroy value in such an imaginary world).
106. For example, India only recently adopted a uniﬁed corporate insolvency system.
The demands for reform leading to its adoption were in response to problems that ﬁt the
hold-up model presented in this paper. See Nimrit Kang & Nitin Nayar, The Evolution of
Corporate Bankruptcy Law in India, ICRA Bull. on Money & Fin., Oct. 2003–Mar. 2004, at
37, 38 (noting the need for reform in the absence of a “single comprehensive and integrated
policy on corporate bankruptcy”); Kristin Van Zwieten, Corporate Rescue in India: The
Inﬂuence of the Courts, 15 J. Corp. L. Stud. 1, 1–3 (2015) (describing two decades of
sustained calls for reform); Rajeswari Sengupta, Anjali Sharma & Susan Thomas, Evolution
of the Insolvency Framework for Non-Financial Firms in India 1, 3 (Indira Gandhi Inst. of
Dev. Rsch., Working Paper No. 2016-018, 2016), http://www.igidr.ac.in/pdf/
publication/WP-2016-018.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9K4-V95K] (describing stalled development of ﬁnancial markets as a result of “the absence of a coherent and effective mechanism
for resolving insolvency”). Calls for insolvency reform in France presented similar themes.
See, e.g., Sophie Vermeille & Alain Pietrancosta, A Critical Appraisal of French Bankruptcy
Law Through the Lens of the Law and Economics Movement: A Solution for the Future?
9–11 (Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Financier, No. 1, 2010) https://ssrn.com/
abstract=1959420 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (articulating how French
bankruptcy law created negotiation inefficiencies and led to “unsound restructuring
plans”).
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relationship-speciﬁc investments.107 Thus, bankruptcy measures will
properly target actions involving or affecting investments speciﬁc to
relationships that relate in some way to the debtor or the debtor’s going
concern.108 Attempts to ﬁx other problems, while potentially valid, are not
bankruptcy measures.109
In presenting the New Bargaining Theory, this Part explores these
theoretical points in detail. First, it explores the incomplete contracting
problem that bankruptcy law should attempt to solve. It then shows why
this problem demands a bankruptcy speciﬁc solution. Finally, it discusses
how the New Bargaining Theory informs the proper scope of Chapter 11.
A.

Bankruptcy’s Incomplete Contract

There are two types of incomplete contracts: obligationally
incomplete and contingently incomplete.110 Obligationally incomplete
contracts have legal gaps; they are missing terms and do not provide
instructions as to how the parties and the courts should respond to certain
states of the world.111 On the other hand, contingently incomplete
contracts provide instructions, but they misﬁre in certain states of the
world.112 When the relevant contingency arises, those instructions are not
what the parties intended and they fail to realize the potential gains from
trade between the parties.113
Incomplete contracts of both types arise when the costs of writing
terms to cover all contingencies are too high. The parties are bargaining
107. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Beneﬁts of Ownership: A
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. Pol. Econ. 691, 695–97 (1986) (modeling
the problem of incomplete contracts and relationship speciﬁc investments); Hart & Moore,
supra note 8, at 757–62 (same); Patrick W. Schmitz, The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete
Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory, 53 Bull. Econ. Rsch. 1, 3–12
(2001) (same); see also Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate
Reorganization, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 538–39 (1983) (noting that in the bankruptcy
context parties who have committed funds to the enterprise are especially susceptible to
hold up).
108. The idea of relationship-speciﬁc investment is closely tied up with the notion of
going-concern value. Going-concern value exists when assets are worth more together than
apart. A relationship-speciﬁc investment is an investment in assets that are worth more as
part of an ongoing relationship. Thus, it is a way to create going-concern value.
109. As many have recognized, using bankruptcy law to address nonbankruptcy
problems can obscure both proper bankruptcy policies and the proper nonbankruptcy
solutions to those problems. See, e.g., Baird, Uncontested Axioms, supra note 57, at 589–92
& n.58 (discussing traditionalist and proceduralist objections to the use of bankruptcy law
to address nonbankruptcy problems).
110. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal
Choice of Legal Rules, 101 Yale L.J. 729, 730 (1992) [hereinafter Ayres & Gertner, Strategic
Contractual Inefficiency] (deﬁning obligationally incomplete and contingently incomplete
contracts).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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with each other, but they cannot write the necessary terms. Costs might
result from a lack of information (the parties cannot predict or deﬁne the
relevant contingencies) or from bargaining failure (the parties play
strategic games that prevent them from agreeing to optimal terms).114 The
agreements might also be incomplete because the parties cannot verify the
relevant contingencies to a court.115 This renders any term that turns on
that contingency unenforceable.116
When an incomplete contract governs a relationship, the parties can
evade the spirit of their initial agreements and take advantage of
unforeseen contingencies or misﬁring terms to extract value from each
other. This is the hold-up problem.117
Stated informally, one party can threaten ex post action that will
destroy value in a contractual relationship.118 To demonstrate the idea,
imagine a contract between A and B. If a certain contingency arises, A
might take action Y that will destroy the value in their relationship. The
contract between them is incomplete in that it does not prohibit such
action. The incompleteness might arise because the parties did not predict
the contingency, or they could not or did not deﬁne it in the contract, or
because they cannot verify its occurrence to a court.
In any event, A might then threaten to take action Y unless B pays a
ransom. Imagine also that B has expended resources that are only valuable
if their relationship with A continues. Having made these relationshipspeciﬁc investments, B is willing to pay the ransom to A in order to preserve
the relationship. A is using the incompleteness—which allows the threat—
to extract a hold-up payment.119
The threat of this ex post hold up, in turn, distorts the parties’ ex ante
interaction.120 Fearing hold up, they either do not enter into the
relationship at all or they limit their relationship-speciﬁc investment in it
over time.121 The remainder of this subsection demonstrates how this
theory applies in the bankruptcy context.
114. See id. at 733 (demonstrating how strategic bargaining can lead to incomplete
contracts).
115. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
116. See Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 8, at 93 (“If there are transaction
costs of explicitly contracting on a contingency, the parties may prefer to leave the contract
incomplete. Indeed, as transaction costs increase, so does the parties’ willingness to accept
a default that is not exactly what they would have contracted for.”).
117. See Hart, supra note 21, at 1733.
118. Id.
119. See id. (illustrating this hold-up problem using a hypothetical contractual
relationship between a coal mine and a power plant).
120. Id. at 1741 (“Unfortunately, when bargaining takes place ex post, ex ante
investments will already have been sunk, hold-up is possible, and, anticipating this, the
parties will choose these investments inefficiently.”).
121. Grossman & Hart, supra note 107, at 695–96 (describing the setup of such a
relationship); Hart & Moore, supra note 8, at 756 (“Given rational expectations by the
parties, the fact that revisions and/or renegotiation will occur will affect the form of the
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1. The Problem of Financial Distress. — Financial distress is common. But
its contours and causes are difficult to predict with any reasonable degree
of certainty. Generally, ﬁnancial distress exists when a ﬁrm cannot ﬁnance
new projects that have net positive value.122 Because investors should be
eager to fund proﬁtable endeavors, ﬁnancial distress implies a market
imperfection and the opportunity for successful legal intervention.123 The
usual suspects for this imperfection are debt overhang, asymmetric
information, and illiquid capital markets.124
Debt overhang arises when existing payment obligations get in the
way of new ﬁnancing.125 A ﬁrm cannot raise new money for valuable
projects because the future revenues from those projects are already
claimed by existing creditors.
Asymmetric information and illiquid capital markets present a slightly
different problem. Here, the debtor cannot convince the market to
provide capital for valuable new projects—either because it cannot
convince investors that it has good projects and is a good credit risk,126 or
because capital and credit markets are generally frozen.127
In a world of perfect ex post bargaining, these problems go away. For
debt overhang, the debtor renegotiates its old relationships to allow new
investments to take priority. The new projects increase the value of the
ﬁrm, and everyone is better off.128 The various parties with an interest in
the debtor reach a bargain to coordinate their behavior, expand the pie,
and split the surplus.129 For asymmetric information, insiders with full

original contract.”); id. at 776 (noting that the parties to an incomplete contract cannot
sustain efficient levels of relationship-speciﬁc investment).
122. See Adler et al., supra note 2, at 26–29 (deﬁning ﬁnancial distress as when a “ﬁrm
cannot generate sufficient revenue to pay its debts” and as “a problem that arises because of
the ﬁrm’s capital structure”).
123. Id. at 28 (describing how “legal rules can help ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress” because
they “ensure that creditors assert their rights in a way that is consistent with the survival of
the ﬁrm as a going concern”).
124. See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 12, at 1557, 1567–72, 1579–87 (describing these
three phenomena).
125. See Adler & Triantis, supra note 85, at 579 (providing an example to illustrate the
debt overhang problem); Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 12, at 1570–71 (explaining debt
overhang); Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. Fin. Econ. 147, 149
(1977) (“The ﬁrm ﬁnanced with risky debt will, in some states of nature, pass up valuable
investment opportunities—opportunities which could make a positive net contribution to
the market value of the ﬁrm.”).
126. See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 12, at 1579–85 (describing how asymmetric
information leads to adverse selection in lending, reducing liquidity).
127. This was the case, for example, during part of the Great Financial Crisis. See
Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007–2008, 23 J.
Econ. Persps. 77, 91–92 (2009) (explaining the causes of liquidity dry-ups).
128. See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 12, at 1576.
129. Without bargaining costs, the parties can always bargain to achieve this mutually
beneﬁcial outcome. See Coase, supra note 5, at 2–15.
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information could agree to self-ﬁnance the ﬁrm’s future projects130 or to
sell the ﬁrm to an insider.131
Bargaining, however, is hindered because the parties have an
incentive to hold out in an attempt to extract value from each other. In
many cases, these hold-out attempts will prevent a negotiated outcome
altogether. With multiparty negotiations, the hold-out incentives will lead
to a collapse in bargaining where no deal is ever struck.132 The problem is
that for every proposed deal, at least one creditor can do better by holding
out.133 Things are even more tenuous when the parties’ varied interests are
complex and difficult for others to ascertain, or when the parties place
different valuations on assets or projects.134
But even where the parties do reach a negotiated outcome, the hold
out incentives are problematic. Say, for example, only one party holds out.
The parties may reach a Coasean bargain that preserves the ﬁrm simply by
agreeing that the other stakeholders will pay a ransom to the hold out.135
In one sense, this is a ﬁne outcome. The ﬁrm is preserved and the ransom
is just a transfer of value. But there is a separate ex ante cost with respect
to investment in the ﬁrm. The next time a potential stakeholder is
investing in a relationship with a debtor, that investor will reﬂect on the
possibility that when distress arises it will have to pay a ransom to a holdout creditor to maintain the value of that relationship. Anticipating this
result, the potential stakeholder will be reluctant to make the ex ante
investment, thus reducing the sources of relationship-speciﬁc investment
for all ﬁrms.
This is not a case where, ex ante, one stakeholder will charge more
and another will charge less and the total cost will remain constant. Rather,
the credible hold outs are likely to be those who have not made
130. This assumes they have access to the necessary funds, which is likely true with banks
that are prepetition lenders. Indeed, prepetition bank lenders very often provide ﬁnancing
for Chapter 11 reorganizations. See Sandeep Dahiya, Kose John, Manju Puri & Gabriel
Ramirez, Debtor-in-Possession Financing and Bankruptcy Resolution: Empirical Evidence,
69 J. Fin. Econ. 259, 265 (2003) (ﬁnding ﬁfty-eight percent of debtor-in-possession loans in
their sample were provided by prepetition lenders).
131. Or they might agree to other solutions aimed at creating liquidity, like allowing the
debtor to access cash or other assets belonging to its affiliates. For an example of this
measure being facilitated by a court order rather than by negotiation, see In re Gen. Growth
Props., Inc., 409 B.R. 43, 61–62 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (allowing the debtor to upstream
cash from subsidiaries to the parent company to provide liquidity to affiliate entities).
132. See Roe, supra note 107, at 539 (“The multiplicity of parties usually present in the
reorganization of a large public ﬁrm could increase the chances of deadlock.”).
133. See id. (“[A]t least one party is often likely to reject the plan because yet another
alternative is better for it . . . .”).
134. See Baird & Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, supra note 3, at 694 (describing how
bargaining among sophisticated parties can collapse even when transaction costs are low
because of problems stemming from “an empty core, radical disagreements about valuation,
or strategic bargaining” and how it can be difficult to ascertain which of these is the problem
in a given case).
135. See supra section II.A.
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relationship-speciﬁc investments, whereas those paying the ransom will be
those who have. The result is a reduction in relationship-speciﬁc
investment. To put it another way, hold outs in bankruptcy extract the
greatest value when others have made investments that only have value
when the debtor’s going concern is preserved, and that provides a
powerful incentive against making those investments.136
2. The Incompleteness of Contractual Responses. — One of the two main
claims in this Article is that Chapter 11 provides bargaining parameters
that are intended to move the parties—somewhat coercively—toward the
ex post bargains necessary to preserve the ﬁrm while minimizing their
hold-up threats.137 An alternative system—the one envisioned by
contractarians and Creditors’ Bargain theorists—might use ex ante rules
in a contract or in legislation to strictly bind the relevant parties to take
certain actions when ﬁnancial distress arises. For example, creditors could
agree to a deﬁned trigger that automatically converts their claims to equity
in order to eliminate debt overhang,138 or they could agree to a trigger that
creates an automatic commitment for certain creditors to provide a new
loan.139
The difficulty for those mechanisms lies in the ex ante choice and
deﬁnition of the precise remedial measures and the veriﬁable
contingencies that will trigger them. The preceding subsection described
distress generally, but every ﬁrm is distressed in its own way. Overhang and
illiquidity might be caused by failed expansion,140 a cyclical downturn,141

136. Prices and markets could adjust for this if each creditor provided equal amounts
of relationship-speciﬁc investments, but that is an untenable equilibrium.
137. For example, Chapter 11 facilitates reorganization plans; global restructuring
relationships and debtor-in-possession ﬁnancing; cramdowns; and free-and-clear sales. 11
U.S.C. §§ 363–364, 1121–1129 (2018). And various forms of partial consolidation across
entities allow for affiliate ﬁnancing. See, e.g., In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. 43,
61 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting the particular advantages of extending credit to a
partially consolidated corporate structure).
138. Professor Adler pioneered this idea. See Adler, Financial and Political Theories,
supra note 88, at 312 (“Should [the hypothetical] ﬁrm become insolvent and default on its
obligations, the common equity class would vanish as would the ﬁxed claims of the next
lowest investor class, which would then become the new common equity class.”).
139. See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 12, at 1594–99 (exploring the idea of coerced loan
commitments).
140. See, e.g., Declaration of Jonathan Goulding, Chief Restructuring Officer of Forever
21, Inc., in Support of Chapter 11 Petitions & First Day Motions at 23, In re Forever 21, Inc.,
No. 19-12122 (Bankr. D. Del. ﬁled Sept. 30, 2019) (noting international overexpansion as a
cause of distress).
141. See, e.g., Tronox Inc. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. (In re Tronox Inc.), 429 B.R.
73, 88 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“The impact of the Legacy Obligations on Tronox, combined
with an inevitable, cyclical market downturn, left it no choice but to ﬁle for Chapter 11
protection.”); see also Ben S. Bernanke, Bankruptcy, Liquidity, and Recession, 71 Am. Econ.
Rev. 155, 155 (1981) (“The onset of recession strains the system by reducing the ﬂow of
income available to meet current obligations and by increasing uncertainty about future
liquidity needs.”); Mark C. Mathiesen, Bankruptcy of Airlines: Causes, Complaints, and
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technological change,142 a systemic liquidity shock,143 a supply shock,144 a
demand shock,145 new competition,146 bad management,147 asymmetric
information,148 a global pandemic,149 or any combination of these or the
many other possible candidates.150
Moreover, the state of affairs when distress hits can take many forms.
The creditors may include banks,151 vendors,152 hedge funds, private equity

Changes, 61 J. Air L. & Com. 1017, 1023 (1996) (noting a recession as a factor in a wave of
bankruptcies).
142. See, e.g., Declaration of Antoinette P. McCorvey Pursuant to Rule 1007-2 of the
Local Bankruptcy Rules for the Southern District of New York in Support of First Day
Pleadings at 11–16, In re Eastman Kodak Co., No. 12-10202 (ALG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. ﬁled
Jan. 19, 2012) (noting the decline of the ﬁlm business in the face of digital photography).
143. See, e.g., Affidavit of Ian T. Lowitt Pursuant to Rule 1007-2 of the Local Bankruptcy
Rules for the Southern District of New York in Support of First-Day Motions & Applications
at 7–10, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. ﬁled Sept. 15,
2008) (describing the liquidity crisis and its impact on Lehman Bros.).
144. See, e.g., Affidavit of Isabella D. Goren Pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 1007-2
at 6–11, In re AMR Corp., No. 11-15463 (SHL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. ﬁled Nov. 29, 2011) (noting
fuel prices as a contributing factor to ﬁnancial distress); see also In re AMR Corp., 477 B.R.
at 397 (noting how increased fuel prices contributed to the airline’s bankruptcy);
Mathiesen, supra note 141, at 1024 (noting how fuel prices led to a wave of bankruptcies).
145. See, e.g., Declaration of Jamere Jackson in Support of Debtors’ Petitions &
Requests for First Day Relief at 29, In re The Hertz Corp., No. 20-11218 (MFW) (Bankr. D.
Del. ﬁled May 24, 2020) (noting that “demand for our core products has been decimated”).
146. See, e.g., Affidavit of Jeffery J. Stegenga Pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 1007-2
in Support of First Day Motions at 16, In re Blockbuster Inc., No. 10-14997 (BRL) (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. ﬁled Sept. 23, 2010) (noting that Blockbuster’s ﬁnancial challenges resulted in
large part from the rise of new competitors in the media entertainment industry).
147. See, e.g., Third Interim Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner at 15,
In re Enron Creditors Recovery Corp., No. 01-16034 (AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed June 30, 2003)
(ﬁnding that Enron’s leaders struggled to manage its merchant investments portfolio).
148. See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 12, at 1580 (describing how information
asymmetries create problems of adverse selection in lending, which “make illiquidity
problems more severe”).
149. See, e.g., Declaration of James Howell in Support of Debtors’ Chapter 11 Petitions
& Related Requests for Relief at 9, In re CEC Ent., Inc., No. 20-33163 (MI) (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
ﬁled June 26, 2020) (noting that the COVID-19 pandemic was the cause of ﬁnancial distress
and that “[i]n ordinary times, the Company would be ﬁnancially sound” and had remained
proﬁtable before the pandemic).
150. See, e.g., Declaration of Bill Wafford, Executive Vice President, Chief Financial
Officer of J.C. Penney Co., Inc., in Support of the Debtors’ Chapter 11 Petitions & First Day
Motions at 25–27, In re J.C. Penney Co., Inc., No. 20-20182 (DRJ) (Bankr. S.D. Tex. ﬁled
May 15, 2020) (noting the combination of reduced demand, new competition, leadership
turnover, and a global pandemic as causes of its ﬁnancial distress).
151. See Michelle M. Harner, Trends in Distressed Debt Investing: An Empirical Study
of Investors’ Objectives, 16 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 69, 75 (2008) (noting that banks will
often sell their claims to exit a bankruptcy).
152. Id. at 75–76 (noting the presence but decreasing importance of vendors).
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ﬁrms,153 or tort victims.154 They may be secured or unsecured.155 They may
include many layers of priority or few.156 They may be dispersed or
consolidated.157 They may include employees158 and competitors.159 They
may have bought or sold claims to or from other claimants.160 They may
have conﬂicting investments.161 They may hold hedged positions or
complex ﬁnancial derivatives like credit default swaps.162 They may need
cash immediately or they may be reluctant to cash out their interests for
regulatory reasons.163 They may be parties to agreements with other
creditors that dictate their actions when distress arises.164
153. Id. at 76 (noting the role of hedge funds and private equity ﬁrms).
154. See Baird & Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, supra note 3, at 653 n.14 (noting that tort
claims are present in a very small number of bankruptcy cases); Richard A. Posner, The
Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 499, 507 (1976) (discussing
tort claims in bankruptcy).
155. Baird & Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, supra note 3, at 653–76 (describing
unsecured and secured lending practices).
156. See Harner, supra note 151, at 83 (describing investors’ preferences for lending at
different tranches of priority). See generally Randal C. Picker, Perfection Hierarchies and
Nontemporal Priority Rules, 74 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1157 (1999) (discussing the different
layers of priority lenders).
157. Baird & Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, supra note 3, at 657 (noting a trend from
cases with dispersed unsecured creditors toward cases with more concentrated groups of
distressed debt investors).
158. See, e.g., Declaration of James Howell in Support of Debtors’ Chapter 11 Petitions
& Related Requests for Relief, supra note 149, at 22 (noting $8,500,431 in compensation
obligations to employees).
159. See, e.g., DISH Network Corp. v. DBSD N. Am., Inc. (In re DBSD N. Am., Inc.),
634 F.3d 79, 87 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting that one creditor was a competitor of the debtor).
160. See Anthony J. Casey, Auction Design for Claims Trading, 22 Am. Bankr. Inst. L.
Rev. 133, 133–34 (2014) (describing how hedge fund involvement in corporate bankruptcy
has dramatically increased the volume of claims trading); Jared Ellias, Bankruptcy Claims
Trading, 15 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 772, 795 (2018) (noting that “claims trading is a
pervasive feature of Chapter 11”); Edith S. Hotchkiss & Robert M. Mooradian, Vulture
Investors and the Market for Control of Distressed Firms, 43 J. Fin. Econ. 401, 402 (1997)
(explaining the various motives of vulture investors who purchase distressed claims);
Victoria Ivashina, Benjamin Iverson & David C. Smith, The Ownership and Trading of Debt
Claims in Chapter 11 Restructurings, 119 J. Fin. Econ. 316, 334 (2015) (describing empirical
scholarship that associates higher debt concentration with the preservation of independent
going concern).
161. See, e.g., In re DBSD N. Am., 634 F.3d at 104 (designating the vote of a creditor that
also held signiﬁcant investment in a direct competitor of the debtor).
162. Baird & Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, supra note 3, at 678–86 (explaining the use
of credit default swaps as a way for lenders to reduce their risk exposure).
163. See, e.g., In re RTJJ, Inc., No. 11-32050, 2013 WL 462003, at *15 (Bankr. W.D.N.C.
Feb. 6, 2013) (“Under pressure from federal regulators, Community One seeks to rid itself
of this nonperforming loan, at any cost. Its aims are noneconomic—at least as to this
Debtor—and are destructive.”).
164. See, e.g., Salus Cap. Partners, LLC v. Standard Wireless Inc. (In re RadioShack
Corp.), 550 B.R. 700, 703–05 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016) (noting a dispute arising out of a web of
intercreditor agreements that dictated the relationships between multiple creditors); see
also Jonathan C. Lipson, Bargaining Bankrupt: A Relational Theory of Contract in
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Finally, different constituencies may have invested deeply in the
relationships that require renegotiation in bankruptcy. The debtor may
face ﬁnancial concerns,165 regulatory pressures,166 union negotiations,167
community pressures,168 or a declining customer base.169 Each of these
problems implicates a different set of relationships as the subject for
renegotiation.
In times of distress, the proper response for each party in these
relationships depends on the speciﬁc characteristics of the entire
constellation of interests. The best way to choose among and implement a
reorganization, going-concern sale, or liquidation will turn on the state of
the market, the causes of distress, and the relationships that exist between
the parties. The speciﬁc causes of distress will impact the willingness and
ability of outsiders to provide new capital and of insiders to take a haircut
or forbear on enforcing claims.170 The speciﬁc agreements and relationships that exist at the time of distress will affect the creditors’ ability and
incentives to bargain toward an optimal outcome, and so on.171
If claimants actually bargain ex ante, they will face insurmountable
challenges.172 Limits on information and time as well as the parties’
incentives to bargain strategically will get in the way of their attempts to

Bankruptcy, 6 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 239, 243 (2016) (“[D]istress investors, who often inﬂuence
large chapter 11 cases, increasingly use contract, or contract-like mechanisms such as
settlement agreements, to evade bankruptcy’s most important mandatory feature, its
priority rules and norms.” (footnote omitted)).
165. See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 12, at 1559–60 (“Since the ﬁnancial crisis, liquidity
problems have been cited as the cause behind both the decisions to ﬁle for bankruptcy and
the outcomes of many Chapter 11 cases.”).
166. See, e.g., Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. NextWave Pers. Commc’ns Inc., 537 U.S. 293,
296–99 (2003) (describing the regulatory charges that led to the bankruptcy proceedings
of NextWave).
167. See, e.g., Supplement B Pilot Beneﬁciaries v. AMR Corp. (In re AMR Corp.), 523
B.R. 415, 417–19 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (describing the renegotiation challenges involved with a
collective bargaining agreement in bankruptcy for American Airlines).
168. See, e.g., Press Release, Tom Carper, U.S. Senate, Carper, Carney Issue Statement
on Fisker’s Bankruptcy Court Proceedings (Jan. 9, 2014), https://www.carper.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm/2014/1/carper-carney-issue-statement-on-fisker-s-bankruptcy-courtproceedings [https://perma.cc/BD5D-8CUC] (stating that in the Fisker bankruptcy, the
Delaware Senator and Representative prefer a bankruptcy resolution that includes open
bidding procedures and continued production at a Delaware plant to create jobs in Delaware).
169. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
170. For example, a cyclical downturn in the industry will limit investment from industry
players and any sale to a strategic buyer. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny,
Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach, 47 J. Fin. 1343,
1344–45 (1992).
171. See Baird & Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, supra note 3, at 687 (explaining that
holders of the same type of claim can have different incentives and abilities, and thus hinder
optimal outcomes).
172. See id. at 698 (“[T]he agreements will likely be incomplete and some recourse to
gap-ﬁlling is necessary.”).

1742

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 120:1709

write contingent substantive rules for every distress situation.173 Similarly,
attempts to write ex ante rules into legislation will be limited by the
legislators’ ability to predict and deﬁne veriﬁable contingencies.174 This is
why the Creditors’ Bargain model and the proposed solutions in its wake
fall short.175 The legislators can no more write the complete contract than
the parties themselves.
Moreover, such a hypothetical complete contract—even if it could be
written—will often produce inefficient outcomes because it fails to account
for asymmetric information and strategic bargaining. As others have noted
in the nonbankruptcy context, “When the parties have asymmetric
information, however, the hypothetical contract standard fails to provide
an effective framework for choosing efficient rules.”176 The framework fails
because it assumes away the bargaining costs that are at the core of the
problem it is trying to solve.177
Also falling short are mechanisms aimed at bringing the creditors
together to write a complete contract.178 If, for example, every debtor
could opt in to its own customized set of bankruptcy rules, and the law
could facilitate the assent of all current and future creditors, those rules

173. See Ayres & Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency, supra note 110, at 759
(noting various impediments to bargaining caused by asymmetric information).
174. See id. (“Setting an efficient default rule will depend upon precise determinations
of underlying variables, a task that is extremely difficult for courts and legislatures.”).
175. This weakness in hypothetical bargaining solutions has been recognized for
decades in the more general context of incomplete contracts. See id. at 733 & n.17 (noting
calls to move away from “hypothetical contract” approaches and “the growing consensus
among contract scholars that default rules should not simply be the hypothetical contract
that parties would choose in a world without transaction costs”); see also David Charny,
Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 Mich. L.
Rev. 1815, 1815 (1991) (noting that the hypothetical contract framework is often “incorrect,
perhaps even incoherent”).
176. Ayres & Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency, supra note 110, at 733.
177. For example, imagine there are two types of creditors dealing with the debtor—A
and B. The debtor cannot distinguish between them. In a perfect world, the debtor would
pay a certain price to A for an A-type contract and a certain price to B for a B-type contract.
But in practice, the parties withhold information and bargain strategically, making it
impossible to reach that outcome. Now imagine the law provides an immutable default rule
that ex post applies A-type rules to A and B-type rules to B. The debtor still cannot
distinguish A and B ex ante. What price should the debtor pay to any given creditor?
Moreover, there is now a new wrinkle to the problem. Do all the parties have symmetric
information about the default rules? If not, that could intensify strategic bargaining. You
can add complications by assuming the creditors are the ones who cannot distinguish the
types or by assuming that parties can switch their type in response to the rule and so on. The
point is that the rule that the hypothetical bargain produces does not solve the problems
presented by the real bargain in these cases. See id. at 765 (“The settings in which strategic
contractual behavior can undermine the use of majoritarian defaults, however, are not
negligible. In a large number of contexts, the parties will have private (asymmetric)
information about a variety of issues relevant to contractual efficiency.”).
178. See supra section II.A.1.
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would still be incomplete because of strategic bargaining and limited
information.179
B.

The Need for a Bankruptcy-Speciﬁc Solution

Incomplete contracts are not a unique bankruptcy problem. Many
contracts (and most pieces of legislation) are incomplete and raise
questions about how to correct for gaps and otherwise incomplete
terms.180
The law might, then, treat incomplete contracts in ﬁnancial distress
the same as any other incomplete contract. That entails a mixture of
judicial gap ﬁlling181 and enforcing terms as written. This is an imperfect
response. When judges do not intervene, the incompleteness will
remain.182 And even when judges do intervene, they will ﬁll gaps
imperfectly and may be unable to verify the information necessary to
enforce a contract.183 Similarly, lawmakers might write a law that
approximates a hypothetical incomplete contract and let courts enforce
that. That contract would probably be short and say something like, “The
parties must behave reasonably in favor of efficiency when distress
arises.”184 Either approach would rely on the courts to ﬁll the substantive
gaps and would likely lead to different prescriptive outcomes from those
advocated by the conventional law-and-economics theories of corporate
bankruptcy.185

179. See supra section II.A.1.
180. See supra note 8; see also Ayres & Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency, supra
note 110, at 730–32 (describing how contracts are incomplete and require gap ﬁlling, and
reviewing scholarship on the problem).
181. This Article uses “gap ﬁlling” to refer to a court directly ﬁlling in a missing term or
rewriting a term that is at odds with the parties’ interests. See Ayres & Gertner, Strategic
Contractual Inefficiency, supra note 110, at 730–31 (noting that courts ﬁll gaps both for
“obligationally incomplete” and for “contingently incomplete” contracts).
182. Parties may try to create private solutions. Scholars have suggested some private
ordering measures to reduce hold-up problems associated with incomplete contracts. See,
e.g., Grossman & Hart, supra note 107, at 692 (developing a theory of integration based on
the attempt of private parties to resolve incomplete contracting problems by allocating
efficiently the residual rights of control between themselves); Hart & Moore, supra note 8,
at 756 (developing a theory of incomplete contracts and exploring strategies parties use to
avoid incomplete contracting problems). But most of those measures are not available in
the corporate bankruptcy context. It is not feasible, for example, for a ﬁrm to integrate with
all of its claimants.
183. See Ayres & Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency, supra note 110, at 732–33
(noting the difficulty for courts to ﬁll gaps).
184. As an aside, it is interesting that the Creditors’ Bargain literature rarely talks about
whether the hypothetical contract is complete or incomplete, rule-based or standard-based,
or whether it assumes perfect information of the bargainers.
185. For example, criticisms of ex post judicial discretion interfering with ex ante
contracting would be less powerful in cases like In re General Growth Properties, Inc., 409
B.R 43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) and Salus Capital Partners, LLC v. Standard Wireless Inc. (In
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As Part III shows, Chapter 11 does not take these approaches. Nor do
most bankruptcy systems in other jurisdictions.186 There are at least two
reasons for this. First, courts would be particularly bad at ﬁlling substantive
gaps in times of ﬁnancial distress. Courts are not experts in strategic
business planning or ﬁnancial structuring—especially not within an
emergency timeframe. Not only does ﬁnancial distress pose uncertainty, it
does so in a context that requires decisions to be made fast: Firms in
ﬁnancial distress are often bleeding cash and their viability can disappear
quickly.187 To be sure, the idea that a debtor business is a melting ice cube
and that any delay threatens its viability is overplayed in bankruptcy
courts.188 Lawyers will argue that the court must decide in a matter of days.
The reality is likely more in the range of weeks or months. But the years
that courts often take to ﬁll substantive gaps in other cases189 are not
available in a corporate reorganization.
Second, this problem is ubiquitous. Virtually all ﬁrms that enter
ﬁnancial distress and need to be reorganized face major incomplete
contracting problems. Of course, if the ﬁrm has totally failed and has no
going-concern value, it can be liquidated easily. But ﬁrms that go into
Chapter 11 reorganization are navigating questions of how to preserve
going-concern value in the face of claims by multiple parties with different
interests in the ﬁrm’s survival.190 Those parties naturally have different
views and incentives for how to achieve the best reorganization outcome.
This state of affairs poses complicated questions of valuation, control, and
vision to which their contracts provide incomplete answers.
The ubiquity of the problem begs for a standardized solution. Given
a class of relationships that routinely raise an incomplete contracting
problem that the courts are bad at solving substantively, it makes sense to
adopt a uniform procedural solution that reduces hold up and increases
predictability. If courts will inevitably be involved when distress arises, the
law can add value by providing a procedural framework for that
re Radioshack Corp.), 550 B.R. 700 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016). See infra section III.C; see also
Ayotte et al., supra note 45, at 269–72 (describing the Radioshack bankruptcy in detail).
186. See generally Global Insolvency Law Database, World Bank (Nov. 17, 2015),
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/ﬁnancialsector/brief/global-insolvency-lawdatabase [https://perma.cc/QDV7-UDB8] (cataloging insolvency laws around the world).
187. See Jacoby & Janger, Ice Cube Bonds, supra note 12, at 865 (noting that
“[f]inancially distressed companies can melt like ice cubes”).
188. Id. at 865–66 (noting the prevalence and overuse of the melting ice cube
argument); Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 Mich. L. Rev.
1, 30–31 (2007) (revealing a lack of empirical evidence for melting ice cube claims).
189. See Inst. for the Advancement of the Am. Legal Sys., Civil Case Processing in the
Federal District Courts: A 21st Century Analysis 4 (2009), https://www.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/iaals_civil_case_processing_in_the_federal_district_courts_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/49LL-26SB] (“[A]bout 35% of cases took more than a year to resolve,
and the longest cases took ten years or more before a ﬁnal resolution was reached.”).
190. Baird & Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, supra note 3, at 651–53 (“Dozens of
constantly changing stakeholders occupy every tranche, each pursuing its own agenda.”).
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involvement. There is little risk of market distortion in legislating a courtsupervised procedure over a set of relationships that will require deep
judicial intervention in any event. Indeed, the law can reduce distortions
if it adds predictability and reduces errors. If courts are error prone in
substantive gap ﬁlling, bankruptcy law can prescribe mechanisms that
address incompleteness but constrain substantive gap ﬁlling as much as
possible.
Moreover, resting that system in one central (federal) court increases
predictability and reduces forum shopping that would otherwise result.191
There are also economies of scale in using a uniform mechanism to
address incomplete contracting in the context of ﬁnancial distress. With
corporate bankruptcy, the hold-up problem is front and center in virtually
every case and it is always triggered by the same thing: ﬁnancial distress.
There is a unique efficiency,192 then, in funneling this entire class of cases
into one uniform system in one court that specializes in resolving this type
of hold-up problem.193 As the courts get better at policing hold up, the
system becomes more efficient and more predictable.194
This also suggests that a uniform government system might be
preferable to private arbitration systems where the economies of scale
might be lost, repeat players—like banks—might take advantage of
asymmetric knowledge and their relationships with the private arbitrators,
or strategic bargaining might otherwise lead to incomplete arbitration
contracts.195
191. One must not, however, be too optimistic. Forum shopping is reduced, but it is
surely not eliminated, by moving cases into the federal system. Parties can still use variations
in the way different federal bankruptcy courts apply the law to extract value from each other.
See Laura Napoli Coordes, The Geography of Bankruptcy, 68 Vand. L. Rev. 381, 388–89
(2015) (describing the availability of and incentives for forum shopping during federal
bankruptcy proceedings).
192. The choice of whether to judicially regulate incomplete contracts always poses a
cost comparison between the costs of allowing parties to simply live with the contracts as
written and the costs of judicial involvement. Ayres & Gertner, Strategic Contractual
Inefficiency, supra note 110, at 733 n.17 (noting the “horse race” between the competing
costs). The economies of scale here make it more cost effective to judicially regulate
problems from incomplete contracts.
193. This does imply that bankruptcy courts must be vigilant about dismissing cases that
are not in this class because they are not related to ﬁnancial distress or hold up. This requires
a robust good faith ﬁling rule. See NMSBPCSLDHB, L.P. v. Integrated Telecom Express (In
re Integrated Telecom Express, Inc.), 384 F.3d 108, 119 (3d Cir. 2004) (describing good
faith ﬁling rules).
194. There will be growing pains when a country ﬁrst adopts a bankruptcy system as its
judges develop this expertise or assign bankruptcy matters to nonspecialized courts. See,
e.g., Andy Mukherjee, India’s Bankruptcies Get a Dose of Common Sense, Bloomberg Op.
(July 17, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-07-18/india-s-creakingbankruptcies-get-lubrication [https://perma.cc/X34N-FA4T] (noting that judges had misapplied India’s new bankruptcy law, necessitating a bold and quick amendment to clarify
the law).
195. See Ayres & Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency, supra note 110, at 764
(describing the difficulties in writing complete arbitration contracts).

1746

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 120:1709

The same cannot be said of the judicial regulation of incomplete
contract disputes generally. While most contracts are incomplete in some
way, not all contract disputes present problems related to that
incompleteness. Nor do all incomplete contracts present hold-up
problems related to relationship-speciﬁc investment or going-concern
value. The volume of general contract disputes that present procedurally
similar hold-up problems is likely not high enough to justify a special
uniform system of laws and a specialized court to resolve those problems.
Moreover, even if such a court did exist, it would be difficult at the
beginning of each litigation to distinguish the hold-up cases from the
other general contract disputes in order to select cases into the specialized
court.
Looking beyond the United States adds support to this story. When
ﬁnancial markets around the world develop faster than local insolvency
law, incomplete contracting problems related to ﬁnancial distress produce
pressures that demand solutions of the sort described in this Article.196
Some jurisdictions allow those pressures to build, only to see dysfunction
and hold up grow along with varied calls for reform.197 In a ﬁnancial system
without a functioning insolvency law, the bankruptcy state of nature is
likely to take one of two extreme forms. Either creditors are left free to
enforce contract terms harshly and formalistically198 or courts ignore
contracts altogether and focus on ex post rescue measures without regard
to the distortions those measures might create.199 Both options allow for
hold up, either by the creditors or by equity and management.
A contractarian might object that the relevant parties should be free
to choose their own contract terms, even if those terms are vague and
incomplete. The question still remains, however, as to how a court should
deal with that incompleteness and the unintended consequences of those
agreements. Bankruptcy law has emerged as a tool for doing that. It is
likely that most parties would prefer such a system if it provides more
predictability and less hold-up opportunity than the bankruptcy state of
nature, which provides no uniform guidance to or constraint on those
ﬁlling the gaps and correcting for incompleteness. But even if the parties
do not prefer a standard uniform system of bankruptcy law, once they
enter into incomplete contracts it is consistent with an efficiency principle
196. See supra note 106.
197. See supra note 106.
198. There are historical examples of this. Elena Cirmizi, Leora Klapper & Mahesh
Uttamchandani, The Challenges of Bankruptcy Reform, 27 World Bank Rsch. Observer 185,
189–90 (2012) (noting that harsh procreditor formalism in nineteenth-century France and
Italy resulted in lower returns for creditors).
199. This is the more likely dysfunction today. For example, Professor Kristin van
Zwieten chronicles the experience in India where judges’ interpretation of India’s thenexistent corporate rescue act, the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985,
sought to rescue companies facing inevitable liquidation and protect employees, eventually
leading to delay, inefficiency, dysfunction, and the need for reform. Van Zwieten, supra
note 106, at 14–28.
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to funnel their disputes through a uniform system to avoid inconsistencies,
externalities, market inefficiencies, and the waste of judicial resources that
would otherwise occur.
C.

A Limited Scope

Because bankruptcy law is not a general welfare system, it should not
address problems unrelated to distress. This conceptual limitation has
several justiﬁcations: (1) doctrinal reasons grounded in constitutional law
and federalism;200 (2) institutional reasons grounded in a view of the
appropriate authority for making those decisions;201 and (3) efficiency
reasons concerned with distorting incentives of parties in ﬁling, avoiding,
or pursuing bankruptcy.202
Saying that bankruptcy law is limited in scope and should address
bankruptcy matters is not the same as the Butner Fallacy. Bankruptcy law
should be directed at bankruptcy matters. But once there is an identiﬁed
bankruptcy issue, nothing about the New Bargaining Theory requires
special deference to nonbankruptcy rights. Rather, as the previous section
demonstrates, the theory merely requires that any measure implemented
to create value in bankruptcy must not destroy more value by distorting
incentives in other states of the world.
True enough, one way that value can be destroyed is through forum
shopping, where parties expend resources to manufacture a bankruptcy

200. See Robert H. George, Bankruptcy for Nonbankruptcy Purposes: Are There Any
Limits?, 6 Rev. Litig. 95, 102–04 (1987) (exploring the Supreme Court’s application of state
and federal law in bankruptcy cases); Mooney, supra note 12, at 960–62, 977–78 (explaining
Thomas Plank’s “doctrinal theory of the limited powers of Congress and the courts under
the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution”); Thomas E. Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism,
71 Fordham L. Rev. 1063, 1089–95 (2002) (analyzing the limitations of Congress’s power to
enact bankruptcy law under the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution).
201. See George, supra note 200, at 104–13 (describing the “bankruptcy court’s use of
its equitable powers to protect the bankruptcy process from misuse and to ensure that
nonbankruptcy rights are disturbed only to the extent necessary”).
202. Though it is not a corporate issue, the parking-ticket-and-bankruptcy debacle in
Chicago is a great example of this. A discriminatory parking enforcement policy in Chicago
has led thousands of Black debtors to ﬁle for Chapter 13 bankruptcy simply because it
provides the only relief to parking ticket enforcement. See Edward R. Morrison & Antoine
Uettwiller, Consumer Bankruptcy Pathologies, 173 J. Institutional & Theoretical Econ. 174,
186–87 (2017). This has imported the racial disparities that exist in parking enforcement
into the bankruptcy system and cost Black drivers thousands of dollars in legal fees. See id.
at 175, 194. It is abundantly clear that a ﬁx to the parking ticket system, rather than
bankruptcy law, would be better. Anthony J. Casey, Consumer Bankruptcy Pathologies:
Comment on Morrison and Uettwiller, 173 J. Institutional & Theoretical Econ. 197, 200–01
(2017) (suggesting that bankruptcy law is not a solution to the disparate racial effects of
parking tickets in Chicago); Morrison & Uettwiller, supra, at 194–95 (“This ﬁnding suggests
that some of the aberrational features of Chapter 13 may be a product of intersecting
features of bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy law . . . .”).
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to change nonbankruptcy entitlements.203 But the New Bargaining Theory
shows us that the only relevant question is whether the costs from forum
shopping outweigh the beneﬁts from reducing other forms of hold up.
The Butner Fallacy asks the question but provides nothing in the way of
answers.
The New Bargaining Theory, on the other hand, instructs that the
farther the parties’ interests are away from a relationship involving the
debtors’ assets, the more skeptical the law should be in assuming that it
can alter those interests to the collective beneﬁt of all interested parties
without causing collateral damage. Thus, bankruptcy law generally does
not account for creditors’ outside interests, such as investments in a
competitor, when implementing bankruptcy’s purpose.204 Likewise, it
generally does not alter the interests of those with no connections to the
debtor.
The economics literature on incomplete contracting states this idea
more formally. Incomplete contracting leads to hold-up problems when
parties have made relationship-speciﬁc investments.205 Thus, the
bankruptcy solution to incomplete contracting over ﬁnancial distress is
only relevant to situations where the parties have made such investments.
Parties who have no direct or indirect relationship with the debtor have
made no investments speciﬁc to a relationship affected by the debtor’s
ﬁnancial distress and are—by deﬁnition—not subject to an incomplete
contracting problem with regard to that distress. On the other hand, those
who have nonclaim relationships with the debtor might still be included
in the partition if they have invested speciﬁcally in those relationships or
if those relationships affect the debtor’s going-concern value.
As Professor Mark Roe has pointed out, the possibility for strategic
behavior and threats is enhanced when parties have committed resources
to an enterprise.206 A threat to tear apart the enterprise is a threat to
destroy those committed resources. When such a threat is credible, parties
can extract value as a payment to not carry through on the threat.
According to the New Bargaining Theory, this is precisely the hold-up
behavior that bankruptcy law should prevent.
The scope of bankruptcy, then, should be the set of relationships
where parties have invested speciﬁcally in the enterprise as a going
concern. Wherever parties have made relationship-speciﬁc investments
203. See Baird, Uncontested Axioms, supra note 57, at 592 n.58 (“If there are two
different legal regimes, parties will invest considerable energy in ﬁnding the legal regime
that most favors them.”).
204. See Baird et al., Bankruptcy Partition, supra note 70, at 1683 (explaining that the
“proper focus” of the bankruptcy partition “is entirely on what goes to creditors on account
of their claims against the estate”).
205. See supra section II.A.
206. See Roe, supra note 107, at 538–39 (noting that because creditors’ funds are
already committed to the enterprise, the bargaining dynamic “provides enhanced
opportunity for strategic behavior, threats, and appeals”).
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that are affected by the debtor’s distress, hold up is a possibility and
bankruptcy law should step in. On the other hand, where parties have
made no such investment, there is no threat of hold up and bankruptcy
law should not be implicated.
Importantly, this suggests a broader scope than the Creditors’ Bargain
Theory and a broader scope than some courts have been willing to adopt.
The interest of nonclaimants who have made such relationship-speciﬁc
investments will be relevant and subject to the bankruptcy power. The
most likely expansion will be along the dimension of human capital, which
is a major relationship-speciﬁc investment associated with most ﬁrms.207
To be clear, this just provides the scope or domain of bankruptcy law.
The speciﬁc resolution of issues that arise within that domain will require
the ex post/ex ante balancing section III.C discusses.
Likewise, contracts that are not directly with the debtor but reﬂect
speciﬁc investments in the debtor’s network of relationships or goingconcern value will be bankruptcy matters. For example, consider the
question of nonconsensual third-party releases. Third-party releases are
provisions in reorganization plans that release one party from liability on
a claim held by another party even when the debtor is not a party to the
claims.208 The controversy arises when the party holding the claim does
not consent to the release.209 The New Bargaining Theory suggests that the
bankruptcy courts can release claims between stakeholders if (1) those
claims are connected to the relevant parties’ relationship with the debtor
and (2) doing so prevents hold up and facilitates efficient ex post
bargaining.210 Of course, consistent with the New Bargaining Theory,

207. See Margaret M. Blair, Firm-Speciﬁc Human Capital and Theories of the Firm, in
Employees and Corporate Governance 58, 58–63 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds.,
1999) (arguing that the relationships among the people who make up ﬁrms ought to be
“incorporated into the legal debate on corporate governance”). In practice, the law is often
inconsistent in how much consideration it gives to these kinds of interests, sometimes
prioritizing job preservation over creditor recoveries. See Thomas H. Jackson & David A.
Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy and Economic Recovery, in Financial Restructuring to Sustain
Recovery 97, 114 (Martin Neil Baily, Richard J. Herring & Yuta Seki eds., 2013). As Jackson
and Skeel note:
Congress often stepped in with a ﬁx, to ensure that the rights of workers,
and the focus on jobs, was not lost in bankruptcy. Prominent examples of
this include Section 1113, constraining the ability to reject collective
bargaining agreements in bankruptcy and Section 1114, constraining
the ability to reduce retiree health care beneﬁts in bankruptcy.
Id. These bills were direct responses to court decisions seen as favoring creditors over
employees. Id.
208. See Lacy v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 280 F.3d 648, 658 (6th
Cir. 2002) (deﬁning and outlining elements for courts to consider when assessing thirdparty releases).
209. Id.
210. One court has applied a standard similar to this in the related context of staying
third-party litigation. See Fisher v. Apostolou, 155 F.3d 876, 882 (7th Cir. 1998) (staying
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there also needs to be a check on the converse hold-up behavior that could
arise from allowing such releases. That check will take the form of a
cramdown payment from the debtor’s estate to the party being forced to
provide the release.211 The appropriate amount of that payment will be an
estimate of the market value of the released claim. Alternatively, the court
could request indubitable proof that the released claims have de minimis
value or that the debtor is not using the releases to extract hold-up value.
Once the court sets the price and evidentiary burdens, then the parties
can begin their bargaining. These measures reduce the potential for
debtors to use third-party releases as a form of hold up.
Relatedly, the New Bargaining Theory suggests that intercreditor
agreements—which often bind creditors to abstain from certain
procedural maneuvers in a bankruptcy proceeding212—should fall under
the bankruptcy umbrella even when the debtor is not a party and the
agreements contain forum selection clauses suggesting otherwise. In
practice, the hold-up risk in intercreditor agreements is high.213 As a result,
courts should not enforce them speciﬁcally unless the party seeking
enforcement meets a very high evidentiary threshold to show that there is
no value extraction.214 But consistent with the analysis above, the court
should impose a market price on the party seeking to escape enforcement.
That price should take the form of expectation damages.215 Once again,
this system reduces the opportunities for hold up on both sides.
III. CHAPTER 11’S RENEGOTIATION FRAMEWORK
This Part turns to Chapter 11’s speciﬁc approach for solving the holdup problem associated with ﬁnancial distress.216 It ﬁrst starts with a general
litigation that was sufficiently related to the debtor and when not granting the stay could
allow one party to derail the reorganization proceedings).
211. See Baird et al., Bankruptcy Partition, supra note 70, at 1688 (raising the possibility
of requiring such a payment).
212. Ayotte et al., supra note 45, at 265–71 (describing various disputes over
intercreditor agreements).
213. Prior work shows that parties can use intercreditor agreements to extract value
from the debtor’s estate. See id. at 284–85; see also ABI’s 200th Podcast Features Judge and
Academics Discussing Side Agreements in Corporate Bankruptcy, at 27:48, Am. Bankr. Inst.
(Apr. 17, 2017), https://www.abi.org/podcasts/abis-200th-podcast-features-judge-andacademics-discussing-side-agreements-in-corporate (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter ABI Podcast with Judge Shannon] (speaking with Judge Brendan Shannon,
who notes that parties use intercreditor agreements to extract windfalls).
214. Ayotte et al., supra note 45, at 287–90.
215. Id.
216. Some relationships that connect to ﬁnancial distress do not fall under the scope of
Chapter 11—although the New Bargaining Theory suggests that they should. The ways that
those relationships play out provide powerful examples of the incomplete contracting
problem and the potential value of the bankruptcy solution. For example, the credit default
swaps market is full of examples of ex post hold up. See, e.g., Matt Levine, Direct Listings
Are a Thing Now, Also Bathroom Meetings, Sears CDS and Bank Culture, Bloomberg Op.
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description of Chapter 11’s renegotiation framework, showing how it
implements the New Bargaining Theory. It then presents examples of the
framework in action. Finally, it concludes with a note about how Chapter
11’s renegotiation framework balances the conﬂicting ex ante and ex post
considerations that lie at the heart of the New Bargaining Theory.
A.

General Description

Consistent with the New Bargaining Theory, Chapter 11 treats the
relationship between those who have an interest in a ﬁnancially distressed
debtor as governed by an incomplete contract.217 Where there is little
reason to suspect that terms will misﬁre—because the parties had full ex
ante information or because the efficient outcome is not affected by
contingencies—the law takes those terms as they are and enforces them.
In this sense, the New Bargaining Theory and the renegotiation
framework support a soft version of Butner not as a principle but as a weak
rule of thumb. In the absence of any evidence of hold up, nonbankruptcy
provisions should remain intact. That is true simply because in the absence
of hold up there is no role for bankruptcy law.
Where the terms might be expected to misﬁre, Chapter 11
implements a structured renegotiation framework.218 Rather than ﬁll the
gaps with speciﬁc substantive provisions or remove incomplete terms, the
Code uses a set of parameters to encourage renegotiation and limit the
parties’ incentives and opportunities to engage in hold up.219
In some sense, the system is ﬁlling in the gaps in these contracts, but
instead of having a judge do it, the parties negotiate the gap-ﬁlling terms
applicable in distress under the court’s oversight and within the law’s
parameters.220 Chapter 11 sets up substantive and procedural guardrails
(Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-01-11/direct-listingsare-a-thing-now [https://perma.cc/N8WH-65A8] (noting the ex post manipulation of bond
prices that are used in calculating payouts from credit default swaps related to the Sears
bankruptcy and explaining the difficulty in writing a better ex ante contract); Matt Levine,
RadioShack Is Running on Credit Derivatives, Bloomberg Op. (Dec. 18, 2014),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2014-12-18/radioshack-is-running-oncredit-derivatives [https://perma.cc/56BQ-UY4M] (same for RadioShack). See generally
Andrew Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation, 56 B.C. L. Rev. 215 (2015) (exploring ex post
benchmark manipulation).
217. See supra Part II.
218. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1195 (2018).
219. The speciﬁc contours of the structure can be found throughout Chapter 11 and
include committee representation, id. § 1102; the creation of creditor classes, id. § 1122;
disclosure and solicitation rules, id. § 1125; voting rules, id. § 1126; the exclusive power of
the debtor to propose a plan, id. § 1121; minimum plan requirements such as feasibility and
the best interest of the creditors test, id. § 1129(a); and cramdown rules, id. § 1129(b).
Other aspects can be found in judicial interpretations of the Code through case law. These
aspects are discussed in detail in this subsection. See infra section III.B.
220. Professors Skeel and Triantis make note of the role of rules and standards and
renegotiation in bankruptcy theory, but they place more trust in ex ante contracting than
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that are intended to direct the parties toward an optimal bargain with
minimal hold up.221 It consolidates bargaining power by consolidating
parties and their interests into classes and other groupings.222 It then rules
out bargaining positions that are either clearly inefficient or are very likely
to lead to hold up.223 Finally, courts subject the parties’ renegotiation
maneuvers to procedural scrutiny and valuation to limit the possibility of
hold up. This is where most of bankruptcy law happens.
In taking this approach, the law accepts that the court cannot know
precisely if ex post interventions are efficient.224 As noted throughout this
Article, the idea of what is efficient and inefficient is dynamic. Bankruptcy
law takes into account the possibility that rules in bankruptcy will have
costs outside of bankruptcy.225 The key is to measure the beneﬁts of a
bankruptcy mechanism against the costs it creates outside of bankruptcy
by distorting behavior. Because it is difficult for anyone—and especially
courts—to measure these costs and beneﬁts exactly, the law implements a
proxy system with bargaining and pricing mechanisms in which parties
must either present extreme evidence to support a deviation from a
default rule or pay an estimate of a market price in exchange for invoking
that deviation.
More speciﬁcally, Chapter 11—through speciﬁc provisions or the
discretion of judges—sets certain default rules and then gives different
Chapter 11 does. See Skeel & Triantis, supra note 37, at 1816. They offer what might be the
strongest normative critique of Chapter 11’s renegotiation framework: Bankruptcy law
makes the wrong empirical assessment about the difficulty in ex ante contracting and the
ability to constrain ex post contracting. Id. This Article is more optimistic that our
bankruptcy system usually gets it right. The important point, however, is that the New
Bargaining Theory identiﬁes this as the key empirical question in assessing Chapter 11. It is
a difficult question to answer. Comparing the experiences in markets in other jurisdictions
around the world might begin to provide some guidance.
221. See Jonathan C. Lipson, The Secret Life of Priority: Corporate Reorganization
after Jevic, 93 Wash. L. Rev. 631, 671 (2018) (discussing judicial safeguards and describing
the guardrails included in bankruptcy plans pursuant to Chapter 11).
222. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (classiﬁcation of claims or interests); id. § 1123(5)(C)
(consolidation of debtors).
223. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
224. Various scholars have recognized this problem. See, e.g., Adler & Triantis, supra
note 85, at 582–83 (acknowledging that ﬁre sales can “yield discount prices because the
market for the debtor’s assets is often illiquid”); Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 12, at 1611–13
(underscoring the possibility of “judicial error” in applying “liquidity-generating rules” that
lead to inefficient continuation of a business); Casey & Morrison, supra note 87, at 205
(describing junior creditors taking advantage of judicial error and valuation variance); Skeel
& Triantis, supra note 37, at 1783, 1816 (describing how an “agreement to renegotiate may
nevertheless be inefficient if it undermines the beneﬁts of the ex ante entitlements”); see
also Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Randal C. Picker, Bankruptcy Rules, Managerial Entrenchment,
and Firm-Specific Human Capital 2–4 (Coase-Sandor Inst. for L. & Econ., Working Paper No.
16, 1993), https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1073&context=
law_and_economics [https://perma.cc/23K7-C59D] (noting the importance of measuring the
ex ante effects of ex post interventions).
225. See infra section III.C.
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parties power to alter those rules. But it subjects that power to market
prices and evidentiary burdens to show good faith or efficiency. A default
rule is set. Then the party against whom the rule operates is given the
power to alter that rule. That power, however, is subject to a pricing system
or evidentiary obligation. Sometimes the party altering the rule must pay
a price or meet a burden to do so. Other times the other party can pay to
negate an altering rule and maintain the default. The allocation of
payment obligations and burdens and the precise nature of the altering
rules are determined based on rough predictions about the relative
likelihoods regarding the sources of hold up. Once the Bankruptcy Code
or court sets these prices and evidentiary burdens, the parties then
renegotiate their relationship under court supervision.
B.

Examples of the Chapter 11 Framework

This section presents examples of the Chapter 11 Framework in
action. It starts with cramdown, a core example that best demonstrates the
New Bargaining Theory at work in Chapter 11. It then turns to automatic
stays, executory contracts, and critical vendor orders.
1. Cramdown. — The New Bargaining Theory functions as a sort of
“cramdown for everything.” It is analogous to the familiar cramdown
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, especially in how such provisions apply
to secured creditors.226 When a reorganization plan is crammed down on
a secured creditor class—that is, when it is conﬁrmed without the consent
of that class—it has the effect of eliminating the creditor’s right to
foreclose on an asset.
Foreclosure rights are ripe for hold up because the parties cannot
contract over all of the relevant contingencies involved, like the value of
the asset being foreclosed, its importance to the ﬁrm’s going concern,
volatility, information asymmetries that affect the availability of ﬁnancing
for the asset, and the creditor’s own liquidity constraints.227 The
Bankruptcy Code therefore grants a debtor the power to alter the default
rule and deprive a creditor of its foreclosure right in a plan of
reorganization. This ensures that the secured creditor cannot use an
incomplete foreclosure contract to hold up the debtor and other creditors
by threatening to withdraw a key asset in distress.
But the Bankruptcy Code also imposes constraints on the debtors’
power. To deprive a secured creditor of its foreclosure right, a debtor must
226. The term “cramdown” is used in the bankruptcy practice to describe the imposition
of a reorganization plan on a class of creditors without their consent. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b). A
plan can be crammed down on a class of creditors if certain statutory requirements are met.
The requirements are set out in Section 1129(b). Id.
227. In particular, these items can all be hard to verify to a court. Thus, even if the
parties did try to contract over contingencies based on the value of an asset or a creditor’s
liquidity, those contracts would be incomplete because when it came time to enforce the
provisions, the parties would not be able to prove to the court that the contingency had
occurred. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.

1754

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 120:1709

do one of three things in a reorganization plan.228 First, the debtor can
give the creditor the proceeds of a sale of the asset if the creditor is allowed
to bid in the sale.229 This ensures that the ultimate buyer values the asset
more than the secured creditor, eliminating the debtor’s opportunity to
use the threat of a sale to extract value from the creditor. The creditor
either gets the asset or gets paid more than its subjective value of the asset.
Second, the debtor can “cram down” the secured creditor by
providing it with a new lien and payments that are valued against what a
new loan on similar terms would cost the debtor on the market.230 This
ensures that cramdown will not give the debtor better than market terms,
thus reducing the debtor’s incentive and ability to use cramdown threats
to extract value in the form of below market terms from the creditor.231
The only beneﬁt the debtor gets from cramdown is eliminating the
transaction costs and asymmetric information problems associated with
ﬁnding a new loan.232
Third, the debtor can provide the creditor with some form of
compensation that is the “indubitable equivalent” of the creditors’
contract right.233 This ensures that the court can allow for unusual
solutions that are efficient and avoid the possibility of a secured creditor
holding up the debtor by insisting on foreclosure when some other better
solution is “indubitably” available. That last standard—“indubitable”—
imposes a high burden because in most cases the court will not be able to
measure the equivalence with precision.234
Thus, the parties must negotiate their way to payment, sale,
foreclosure, a new lien, or something else. The alternative to a negotiated
agreement is in the hands of one party—the party who might be held up
by the default rule—who chooses between the default rule or an alteration
228. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b).
229. Id. §§ 363(k), 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).
230. See id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i). This is the proper reading of the statute. Casey,
Bankruptcy’s Endowment Effect, supra note 62, at 149 (arguing that § 1129(b)(2)
establishes “a ﬂoor for what will qualify as fair and equitable”). The Second Circuit has
adopted this approach, but the question is unsettled in the courts. See Momentive
Performance Materials Inc. v. BOKF (In re MPM Silicones, L.L.C.), 874 F.3d 787, 800–01
(2d Cir. 2017) (adopting a two-step approach that considers market rates).
231. See In re MPM Silicones, L.L.C., 874 F.3d at 792, 800 (involving a debtor who
threatened to cram down an interest rate $150 million below the market rate to extract
procedural concessions); Casey, Bankruptcy’s Endowment Effect, supra note 62, at 161
(arguing for limiting “opportunistic behavior by requiring the debtor to pay market rates
when it opts to cram down a loan”).
232. This requires the court to estimate the market value of the new loan. Evidence of
that value is often available. See, e.g., In re MPM Silicones, LLC, No. 14-22503-rdd, 2014 WL
4436335, at *11, *25–29 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014) (describing methodologies and
availability of evidence for determining value).
233. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii).
234. Douglas G. Baird & Anthony J. Casey, Bankruptcy Step Zero, 2012 Sup. Ct. Rev.
203, 220 (noting that the court’s discretion is limited by the standard of indubitable
equivalence to avoid erroneous dilution of a creditor’s claim).
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subject to paying some value or meeting some burden of proof. Chapter
11 puts in place these guardrails to make certain outcomes easier or
harder for parties to force on each other depending on how much the
system trusts the court to protect against misbehavior by the party
advocating that outcome.235 Because the debtor has the power to alter the
default rule and cram a plan down on creditors—which becomes the
alternative to a negotiated agreement—the debtor bears the burden of (1)
providing an auction where the creditor is allowed to bid, (2) providing
new loan terms that it can prove match the market, or (3) proving that it
is providing an indubitable equivalent of the right that is being altered.236
2. The Automatic Stay. — The automatic stay is one of bankruptcy’s
central provisions.237 It directly addresses the classic “collective action”
problem.238 That problem is one particular type of hold up, and the
Bankruptcy Code responds to it by implementing default rules along with
special altering rules that impose price and evidentiary burdens to reduce
the risk of hold up.
The Bankruptcy Code’s default rule is that actions to enforce or
recover on prepetition claims or to obtain possession of property from the
estate are prohibited during bankruptcy.239 But the Bankruptcy Code
allows a party to alter that rule if it can show that its interest is not
adequately protected,240 or where it can show it is enforcing an ownership
right in property that is not necessary for the debtor to effectively
reorganize.241
These rules track the analysis of the Chapter 11 Framework presented
above. Because contracts are incomplete, parties have the ability to
enforce claims against a debtor in ﬁnancial distress even when those claims
will destroy value. A complete contract would provide speciﬁc situations
when individual enforcement is allowed because it does not destroy value
and speciﬁc situations where it is not allowed because it does. But ex ante
uncertainty and the cost of strategic bargaining are too high for the parties
to write that contract. As a result, parties can use the incompleteness to
threaten to enforce claims in a way that will destroy ex post value. That
threat allows them to extract value from the estate.242
235. The system operates as a set of altering rules customized to the law’s expectations
about hold-up behavior. See supra section III.A. See generally Ian Ayres, Regulating OptOut: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 Yale L.J. 2032 (2012) (developing a theory
of altering rules).
236. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b).
237. See id. § 362.
238. See supra section I.A for a discussion of “collective action.”
239. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1)–(3), (6).
240. Id. § 362(d)(1).
241. Id. § 362(d)(2).
242. See, e.g., United Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Bank N.A., 406 F.3d 918, 924–25 (7th Cir.
2005) (noting that a creditor’s threat to use a special statutory provision excepting aircraft
from the automatic stay would result in “tough bargaining” and allow the creditor to extract
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To combat this threat of hold up, the Code’s default rule prohibits
claimants from exercising their rights.243 But that default rule itself creates
a converse risk of hold up. The debtor can extract value from a claimant
by threatening to eliminate its enforcement right with a bankruptcy ﬁling.
And so, the Code allows the claimant to alter the default rule by meeting
one of the two requirements.244 First, the claimant can demand adequate
protection for its interest from the debtor.245 This imposes a price of sorts
that the debtor must pay to maintain the default rule. That price is set at
an amount that ensures that the debtor is not using the automatic stay to
extract value from the claimant.246 Second, the claimant can lift the stay if
it can meet a high evidentiary burden of showing that it is enforcing an
ownership right that will not have a negative effect on the debtor’s
reorganization.247 This amounts to an evidentiary showing that the
claimant is not trying to hold up the debtor. If the property is not necessary
to an effective reorganization, then the threat to enforce against it has no
hold-up value.
3. Executory Contracts. — As another example, the Bankruptcy Code
implements a similar but more crude approach to the assumption of
executory contracts.248 An executory contract is generally deﬁned as one
that is unperformed on each side such that failure by either party “to
complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the
performance of the other.”249 These contracts provide ample ground for
small acts of hold up.
For example, the debtor may have breached a critical contract on the
eve of bankruptcy, perhaps by missing a payment. Pointing to the missed
payment, the counterparty might then threaten to walk away from the
contract unless the debtor pays a new higher price for the relationship.
Where the debtor has invested heavily in the relationship with the
counterparty, this threat can be powerful. And even though the walk-away
threat might be a mere bluff, if the debtor pays the ransom, the
counterparty has succeeded in its hold-up attempt.

value from the estate); Chrysler LLC v. Plastech Engineered Prods., Inc. (In re Plastech
Engineered Prods., Inc.), 382 B.R. 90, 110–11 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2008) (refusing to lift the
automatic stay where a claimant was threatening an action that would shut down the
debtor’s business).
243. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1)–(3), (6).
244. See id. § 362(d).
245. Id. § 362(d)(1).
246. See, e.g., In re Rogers, 239 B.R. 883, 887 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1999) (noting that
adequate protection is set by a “pragmatic and synthetic” balancing of all relevant factors to
determine the risk that the creditor will lose value by the continuation of the stay).
247. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2).
248. See id. § 365. A similar analysis applies to questions about critical vendor orders.
See infra section III.B.4.
249. Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 Minn. L. Rev.
439, 460 (1973).
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The appropriate solution to this problem would not be to allow the
debtor to simply ignore all prior breaches, as that would turn the
bankruptcy process into a tool to evade contract law. And so the
Bankruptcy Code provides special rules for a debtor to assume the
breached contract and bind the other party to perform.250 But consistent
with the Chapter 11’s renegotiation framework, the Code requires the
debtor to pay a market price to alter the default rules in that way.251 This
price takes the form of a payment to cure past defaults.252 Because the
stakes are lower, precision is not demanded and this price is only an
approximate measure of the market.
Bankruptcy law thus allows a debtor to enforce executory contracts
that it has breached.253 This right ensures that the counterparty cannot use
a technical breach to hold up the debtor by withdrawing a key agreement
from the debtor’s relationships. But the debtor must ﬁrst cure all past
defaults.254 This serves as a price that roughly estimates the market value
of the breached contract terms. It ensures that the debtor does not use
bankruptcy to hold up the creditor by ignoring the value of substantive
obligations in their relationship.255
4. Critical Vendor Orders. — A ﬁnal—but related—example is that of
critical vendor orders. In the same way that a counterparty to a contractual
relationship might walk away from the debtor, so too can a counter party
to a noncontractual relationship. In those cases, a debtor may then desire
to make a market payment to keep that party from walking away.
Critical vendor orders allow the debtor to pay a chosen vendor on
prepetition claims—ahead of other creditors—to entice the vendor to
continue doing business with the debtor.256 The result is similar to what
happens when a debtor assumes an executory contract under 11 U.S.C.
§ 365. The relationship continues, and the counterparty gets paid ahead
of other creditors. But there are two differences. First, the counterparty
has the option of walking away; the debtor cannot coercively extend the
relationship. Second, the debtor must meet a higher burden in proving
that the vendor is critical.257
Chapter 11’s renegotiation framework can explain this approach. A
relationship counterparty can hold up a debtor by threatening to walk
away even when their relationship is not a formal contract. But without the
250. See 11 U.S.C. § 365.
251. See id. § 365(b)(1)(A).
252. See id.
253. See id. § 365.
254. See id. § 365(b)(1)(A).
255. This analysis suggests a justiﬁcation for the current rule. It provides a
counterargument to Professor Skeel’s proposal to do away with the requirement that the
debtor cure prebankruptcy defaults. See Skeel, The Empty Idea of “Equality of Creditors,”
supra note 102, at 721–22.
256. See In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 868, 872 (7th Cir. 2004).
257. Id. at 866.
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contract, there is an exacerbated risk of debtor misbehavior. Evidence
about the purpose and intended duration of the relationship is scant, and
a debtor who could coercively extend the relationship might use a
bankruptcy ﬁling to extract value.
To deal with competing risks of hold up, the law on critical vendor
orders allows the debtor to pay to extend the relationship over the
objection of other creditors—who may themselves be trying to hold up the
estate.258 But the debtor is not allowed to pay too much. If it were, the
critical vendor and the debtor could collude to extract value from the
other stakeholder. The law thus requires the debtor to make a high
evidentiary showing that the payment is efficient and not part of a hold-up
scheme.259
*

*

*

Throughout the Code, there are price and burden allocations like this
that allow a party to pay a cramdown price of sorts to alter a rule that would
otherwise apply. The Code implements this framework where the
underlying terms of the parties’ relationships are expected to misﬁre and
provide hold-up opportunities. The prices and other limiting principles
give the court comfort that the likelihood of abuse by the party altering
those terms is low. Within the parameters set by these rights, prices, and
limitations, the parties ﬁnd their negotiating positions and bargain with
each other. Thus, Chapter 11 implements default rules and then layers on
altering rules260 in the form of prices or other undertakings required to
demonstrate a reduced risk of hold up.261
C.

The Balance Between Ex Ante and Ex Post Concerns

Like the law of general averages, the New Bargaining Theory and
Chapter 11’s renegotiation framework take into account ex ante
incentives. In the admiralty context, one could, of course, achieve the
efficient ex post outcome by transferring title to all cargo to the captain
(or any decision maker) at the moment the ship hits distress.262 This would
258. See id. at 868, 872 (describing when a debtor might be allowed to make critical
vendor payments).
259. See id. at 873 (“[I]t is necessary to show not only that the disfavored creditors will be
as well off with reorganization as with liquidation . . . but also that the supposedly critical vendors
would have ceased deliveries if old debts were left unpaid while the litigation continued.”).
260. For more on the theory of altering rules, see Ayres, supra note 235, at 2036–46.
261. Examples exist throughout the Bankruptcy Code. Another prominent nonprice
example is the requirement that a plan of reorganization have one impaired class of
creditors vote in favor of it. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (2018). This is intended to reduce—
but certainly does not eliminate—the risk that a proposed plan is an inefficient hold-up
maneuver asserted against impaired creditors. This purpose of § 1129(a)(10) is clear. In
practice it is not difficult to circumvent and may do very little.
262. In bankruptcy, Professor Adler has made a proposal like this that gives complete
ownership to a creditor class when distress hits. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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efficiently align ex post control and ownership. But few would advocate for
that law. The captain would do everything they could to lead the ship to
distress and others would be reluctant to even bring cargo onto the ship.263
Chapter 11 likewise considers the impact of its interventions on ex
ante and predistress incentives. But unlike the law of general averages, it
does not implement a blanket rule of average contribution.264 Rather it
encourages the “passengers” to negotiate over their contributions under
court supervision and within certain parameters.265
In all of this, there is no reason to think interventions that focus on
ex post outcomes are per se inefficient. Consider the high-proﬁle
bankruptcy of General Growth Properties.266 To provide a short summary,
in 2009, General Growth Properties faced a liquidity crisis.267 The ﬁrm had
a proﬁtable business, but it owed balloon payments on loans that it could
not reﬁnance in the midst of the Great Financial Crisis.268 A bankruptcy
ﬁling for the whole enterprise—parent and subsidiaries—provided a
solution.269
There was one problem: The subsidiaries of the business were set up
to be bankruptcy remote.270 The legal structure of the subsidiary entities,
their corporate governance documents, and their agreements with lenders
ostensibly prevented them from ﬁling for bankruptcy.271 The parent
caused the subsidiaries to ﬁle bankruptcy anyway.272 The creditors of the
subsidiary entities challenged this maneuver.273 In the end, the bankruptcy
court allowed the ﬁlings notwithstanding the agreements set up to prevent
them.274

263. Similarly, few would advocate giving the ownership of all cargo to the poorest
passenger when distress arises to achieve general redistributive justice. In addition to being
one of the worst possible means for redistributing wealth, this measure would also distort
predistress incentives by causing the poorest passenger to favor distress and distort ex ante
incentives by driving other passengers out of shipping markets and perhaps leading captains
to reject poor passengers altogether.
264. See, e.g., Skeel, The Empty Idea of “Equality of Creditors,” supra note 102, at 701
(noting the lack of equality norms in Chapter 11 practice).
265. This is a form of coerced ex tempore contracting. See Andrew Verstein, Ex
Tempore Contracting, 55 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1869, 1881–86 (2014) (introducing the
concept of privately-agreed-to ex tempore contracting).
266. In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. 43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
267. Id. at 53–54.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 54–55.
270. Id. at 63–64.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 54–55.
273. Id. at 55.
274. Id. at 69.
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The court’s ruling in General Growth has been criticized for ignoring
ex ante contracts in the service of ex post value maximization.275 Critics
predicted that this would lead to an increase in ex ante interest rates as
creditors no longer trusted the enforceability of their agreements.276
There is no evidence that such increase ever occurred.
One might even predict the opposite result. At the end of the day, the
General Growth bankruptcy was a great success story.277 All stakeholders’
claims were paid in full, equity retained its value, and the company was
successfully reorganized.278 It might actually demonstrate that courts are
good at determining when hard-edged contract terms misﬁre. Perhaps the
case was evidence that courts will ignore those terms if, but only if,
someone has made a sufficient showing that the terms are inefficient, that
they are being invoked as a hold-up maneuver, that deviating from them
won’t create hold up on the other side, and that an appropriate pricing
mechanism has been implemented.279 The court may have reached a high
275. See, e.g., W. Rodney Clement Jr. & H. Scott Miller, General Growth: Special Purpose
Entities (Barely) Survive First Bankruptcy Test, 25 Prob. & Prop. 31, 34 (2011) (outlining
how the court’s actions could be perceived as prioritizing the “massive forfeiture [that] was
at stake” over “the separateness covenants existing in the loan documentation”); Jesse CookDubin, New York Bankruptcy Court Topples Contractual Barriers to Filing Chapter 11: Part
II, 28 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 16, 16 (2010) (examining the implications of the court “ﬁnding
good faith notwithstanding the subject debtors’ alleged disregard of the SPE and
bankruptcy-remote elements in their organizational documents”); Brian M. Resnick &
Steven C. Krause, Not So Bankruptcy-Remote SPEs and In re General Growth Properties, Inc.,
28 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 1, 62 (2009) (noting that the case “was viewed by many market
participants as inconsistent with the protections thought to be provided to lenders in
structured ﬁnance transactions involving bankruptcy-remote vehicles in the event of a
bankruptcy of their corporate parent”).
276. See Resnick & Krause, supra note 275, at 62.
277. Ilaina Jonas, General Growth Cleared to Exit Bankruptcy, Reuters (Oct. 21, 2010),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-generalgrowth/general-growth-cleared-to-exit-bankruptcyidUSTRE69K41320101022 [https://perma.cc/XD4H-5LMD] (noting the success of the reorganization).
278. Id. (noting the full payment of bonds and an equity value of $5.2 billion).
279. The court did require some signiﬁcant proof on these matters.
See In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. at 63 (noting that the ruling produced “no
sacriﬁce of fundamental rights”); id. at 65 (noting the irony of the opportunistic use of
“leverage” by the party trying to enforce the contract terms); id. at 67–70 (repeatedly noting
the “good faith” of the debtor); id. at 69 (noting the other bankruptcy measures available
to creditors to limit the debtors attempts to hold them up); id. at 55 (noting that the order
allowing use of cash “had various forms of adequate protection . . . such as the payment of
interest at the non-default rate, continued maintenance of the [subsidiary] properties, a
replacement lien on the cash being upstreamed . . . and a second priority lien on certain
other properties”). The court may have simply concluded that it was worth saving this one
company in this unique set of circumstances because lenders would know that the threshold
for such intervention is sufficiently high to avoid market distortions. But counterexamples
may appear if courts are not vigilant about hold up. For example, in In re MPM Silicones,
L.L.C., the court allowed the debtor to exercise ex post control over interest rates to extract
concessions and value from creditors before the opinion was reversed on appeal. Momentive
Performance Materials Inc. v. BOKF (In re MPM Silicones, L.L.C.), 874 F.3d 787, 800–01
(2d Cir. 2017).
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degree of conﬁdence in its conclusion that the creditors of the subsidiaries
were using an incomplete contract to hold up the ﬁrm and extract
individual gains from the enterprise.
Indeed, if one thinks that bankruptcy disputes are rare relative to the
number of ﬁrms operating in the market and that Chapter 11’s
renegotiation framework is good at excluding extreme bad faith positions,
then one might conclude that Chapter 11 could interfere with all kinds of
nonbankruptcy entitlements to create ex post value without imposing
distortionary costs on the market. The actions and statements of judges in
recent bankruptcy cases are consistent with this analysis. As one prominent
bankruptcy judge recently explained, bankruptcy courts are reluctant to
enforce contract terms that allow a creditor to opportunistically extract
extra value, noting that “bankruptcy courts have, in a variety of different
contexts, struggled mightily and usually successfully to avoid giving a party
a windfall.”280
The question in all of this is how much one trusts the process to
identify these things. Chapter 11 relies heavily on the parties and ﬁnds
comfort when sophisticated parties have bargained vigorously toward an
arm’s length resolution.281 And judges do require a high level of
conﬁdence before exercising their discretion to achieve ex post value.282 If
this setup fails to identify and address these issues, then Chapter 11 does
not work well. If the courts have a good process for ruling out extreme
behavior, keeping the parties within the guardrails, and operating within
an acceptable margin of error, then Chapter 11 is successful.
*

*

*

One ﬁnal and important critique of Chapter 11’s renegotiation
framework might be that destroying value ex post is actually a good thing.
As many—including me—have pointed out, there is a positive disciplining
effect from destroying value in bankruptcy.283 Parties have an incentive to
280. ABI Podcast with Judge Shannon, supra note 213, at 27:48; see also Lyondell Chem.
Co. v. CenterPoint Energy Gas Servs. Inc. (In re Lyondell Chem. Co.), 402 B.R. 571, 594
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[T]here will sometimes be a harm requiring judicial intervention
where the needs and concerns of other creditors simply trump commercial predictability.”);
Ayotte et al., supra note 45, at 269–72 (providing a detailed analysis of the RadioShack
bankruptcy suggesting that the court may have interpreted contract rights to avoid hold up
and facilitate an efficient sale of assets).
281. Ayotte et al., supra note 45, at 286 (noting that the system depends on the
bargaining positions of sophisticated creditors to provide beneﬁts to the estate as a whole).
282. See supra note 279 (presenting the thorough nature of the judicial inquiry in the
General Growth case); see also ABI Podcast with Judge Shannon, supra note 213, at 27:15
(discussing the considerations of bankruptcy judges in dealing with contract terms that
present “windfalls” in various cases).
283. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Anthony J. Casey, No Exit? Withdrawal Rights and the
Law of Corporate Reorganizations, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 9–10 (2013) (detailing that
investors with a withdrawal right will use it as leverage in negotiations during default and
managers will consequently have a strong incentive to avoid default).
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avoid distress if they will be punished when distress arises.284 Creditors can
use that incentive as a substitute for monitoring the debtor or each
other.285
One could imagine a rule that allows the use of bankruptcy penalties
but only if the court is sure that the penalty clause is a substitute for
monitoring. Penalties like this work by making control and payment rights
state-contingent.286 But what if the speciﬁcs of that contingency are
themselves noncontractible? Deﬁning the different states that trigger the
contingency might be very difficult, and that is where the renegotiation
framework comes in. Bankruptcy law might treat state-contingent penalty
terms as incomplete contracts that may or may not provide the opportunity
for hold up depending on how things have played out in a speciﬁc case.
There is good reason to think state-contingent penalty terms are,
indeed, incomplete. The tradeoff between the value preserved through ex
post intervention and the ex ante discipline created by ex post penalties
will always be uncertain. To put it another way, which is the ﬁrst order
problem: the ex ante incentives or the ex post coordination?287 Parties
cannot know the answers to these questions when they initially write their
contracts. They would have to know the actual cause of distress. For
example, can one really posit that General Growth, Kodak, American
Airlines, Calpine, Toy “R” Us, Chuck E. Cheese, Hertz, and the like all
would have avoided distress if only the decisionmakers had known that
bankruptcy would be more severe? On the other side of the equation,
284. See Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete Contracts Approach to
Financial Contracting, 59 Rev. Econ. Stud. 473, 486 (1992).
285. See id.
286. See id. at 490–91; Patrick Bolton & David S. Scharfstein, Optimal Debt Structure
and the Number of Creditors, 104 J. Pol. Econ. 1, 5–8 (1996) (“[T]he threat of liquidation
serves as a way of inducing the manager to pay out cash ﬂow instead of diverting it to himself.
If he were to keep the ﬁrst-period cash ﬂow, the creditor would be given the right to
liquidate the assets with [a certain] probability . . . .”); Jaime F. Zender, Optimal Financial
Instruments, 46 J. Fin. 1645, 1647 (1991) (“The state-contingent transfer of control relaxes
an incentive constraint that would bind if bankruptcy were not allowed, enhancing the value
of the ﬁrm as a going concern.”). This academic theory may play a minor role in practice.
The idea assumes that managers will be punished by losing their equity. But managers can
be more directly punished through job insecurity, incentive-based pay, or reputational
consequences. Moreover, equity is usually wiped out in bankruptcy. Destroying further
would harm junior creditors, not equity holders. The prime question in practice is thus
whether to penalize junior creditors. But that won’t affect managers’ incentives directly.
Unless junior creditors are calling the shots (at least indirectly through monitoring) before
bankruptcy, there is little sense in punishing them after the ﬁling. Of course, if the junior
creditors were the optimal monitors, then the penalties on them would be a way for senior
creditors to “monitor the monitors.”
287. Professor Ayotte’s models have ﬂagged a similar problem. See generally Ayotte,
Disagreement, supra note 45 (exploring how in complex capital structures, unlocking ex
ante value can lead to ex post inefficiencies in the form of valuation disputes); Ayotte,
Mandatory Stay of Secured Creditors, supra note 89, at 150–51 (arguing that in order to
evaluate the usefulness of legal subsidiaries as pathways around mandatory stays, one must
ﬁrst ask why mandatory stays are valuable in the ﬁrst place).
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would the reorganization values have been much lower if some creditors
were allowed to inﬂict more pain on others when distress arose? The
answer is likely different for each debtor.288 An optimal approach would
be to say that if misbehavior is likely to have occurred and may have
contributed to the distress, then and only then should reasonable penalty
terms be enforceable. And it may be that judges—even though they are
not great at knowing exactly how to substantively restructure a company’s
ﬁnances—are pretty good at implementing Chapter 11’s renegotiation
framework and using its guardrails to detect when distress is a result of
poorly disciplined management or uncontrollable market forces, and
which penalty terms are worth enforcing.
IV. APPLYING THE NEW BARGAINING THEORY TO FRONTIER ISSUES
As noted above, bankruptcy’s cramdown provisions provide a clear
example of the New Bargaining Theory at work in Chapter 11’s
renegotiation framework.289 Along the way, this Article has also
demonstrated the theory’s application to simple questions like executory
contracts290 and more cutting-edge problems like third-party releases and
intercreditor agreements.291 But the theory is broadly applicable—one can
march through the core features of bankruptcy law to see this.292 This Part
presents two additional examples of how the New Bargaining Theory can
resolve questions at the frontier of bankruptcy practice today. It starts with
an example where the theory can resolve a recent split among courts and
288. In the cases mentioned, the causes of distress, the role of management, and the
balance between ex ante discipline and ex post value preservation varied widely. For
example, Kodak’s primary failure was in being too slow to respond to technological change,
see Brook E. Gotberg, Technically Bankruptcy, 48 Seton Hall L. Rev. 111, 138 (2017), while
Chuck E. Cheese’s business was crippled solely by a global pandemic. See Declaration of
James Howell in Support of Debtors’ Chapter 11 Petitions and Related Requests for Relief,
supra note 149, at 9 (noting the pandemic as the cause of ﬁnancial distress). And while J.C.
Penney struggled through the failure of four different management teams with different
CEOs in the nine years before it ﬁnally ﬁled for bankruptcy, Declaration of Bill Wafford,
Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer of J.C. Penney Co., Inc., in Support of the
Debtors’ Chapter 11 Petitions & First Day Motions, supra note 150, at 5, 27, General
Growth’s bankruptcy was driven primarily by a liquidity crisis associated with ﬁnancial
markets and not operating performance. In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. 43, 53
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“However, in the latter half of 2008, the crisis in the credit markets
spread to commercial real estate ﬁnance, most notably the CMBS market. This in turn
affected the ability of [General Growth] to reﬁnance its maturing debt on commercially
acceptable terms.”). In contrast, the American Airlines bankruptcy was more complicated,
involving residual effects of the events of September 11, 2001, stalled labor negotiations, the
earlier restructuring of its major competitors, increased price and price volatility of jet fuel,
the effects of the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008, and other factors. Affidavit of Isabella D. Goren
Pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 1007-2, supra note 144, at 6–11.
289. See supra section III.B.1.
290. See supra section III.B.3.
291. See supra notes 208–215 and accompanying text.
292. See supra Part II.
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then presents a theoretical approach to a more fundamental question
regarding priority rules and the new value exception.
A.

Court Splits: Sections 363(f) and 365(h)

Recently, courts have struggled over an ambiguity in the Bankruptcy
Code regarding the fate of leases in an asset sale.293 Section 363(f) of the
Code allows the debtor to sell its assets free and clear of a stakeholder’s
interests.294 But Section 365(h) provides that even if a debtor rejects a
lease, the lessee retains its rights to use and possession under the lease.295
The question, then, is what happens to a lessee when the debtor sells the
leased property under Section 363(f)? Is the sale free and clear of the lease
under Section 363(f) or does the lessee retain its rights under Section
365(h) after the sale?
The statutory language is complicated and ambiguous at best, and
courts have split on the appropriate reading.296 The renegotiation
framework provides policy guidance. Section 365(h) is addressed at
reducing a hold-up threat. Lessees may make very large investments that
are speciﬁc to their lease. A debtor who can threaten to terminate a lessee
by ﬁling bankruptcy has powerful hold-up leverage. As a result, the
Bankruptcy Code prohibits that action.297 It even implements a complex
pricing mechanism to balance the dual risks of hold up.298
On the other hand, Section 363(f) is also addressed at reducing a
hold-up threat. Often the only way to reorganize a debtor is through a freeand-clear sale.299 To give one lessee the ability to veto that sale would create
an enormous hold-up opportunity. Moreover, the sale through a
competitive auction—which is itself a market-price test—reduces any risk

293. See Pinnacle Rest. at Big Sky, LLC v. CH SP Acquisitions, LLC (In re Spanish Peaks
Holdings II, LLC), 872 F.3d 892, 897–98 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that courts are split on
whether a sale under 363(f) can extinguish a lessee’s rights to remain in possession of the
leasehold, and holding that the sale does extinguish the lessee’s rights); Precision Indus.,
Inc. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ, LLC, 327 F.3d 537, 548 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that a sale
under 363(f) extinguished the lessee’s possessory interest); Dishi & Sons v. Bay Condos LLC,
510 B.R. 696, 702–07 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (highlighting the court split and concluding that a
sale does not extinguish the lessee’s possessory interest except in limited circumstances).
294. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2018).
295. Id. § 365(h)(1)(A)(ii).
296. See In re Zota Petroleums, LLC, 482 B.R. 154, 160 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2012)
(providing an overview of contrasting approaches to the interplay between sections 363(f)
and 365(h)).
297. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1)(A).
298. Id. § 365(h)(1)(A)–(B) (establishing that the lessee must pay rent, can offset any
damages caused by the debtor’s nonperformance of obligations, but does not otherwise
have a right to collect those damages).
299. Id. § 363(f)–(g).
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that the debtor is attempting to hold up the lessee.300 While it is likely that
a debtor might use a bankruptcy ﬁling to terminate a lease, it is much less
likely that it would sell its business to do so. Thus, as long as there is no
evidence that sale is a sham, the rule that best constrains hold up on both
sides is one that allows a sale free and clear of leases with appropriate
market tests and compensation requirements.
B.

Major Questions: Priority Rules and the New Value Exception

The Butner Fallacy and the Creditors’ Bargain are probably most
pernicious when it comes to debates about priority rules in bankruptcy.
Priority rules dictate the order in which creditors are paid from the value
that results after a bankrupt debtor is reorganized.301 In theory, the current
bankruptcy system requires “absolute priority,” which means that creditors
are paid strictly in order of their nonbankruptcy priorities as if the ﬁrm
was being liquidated.302 In reality, absolute priority is a rough guideline
from which outcomes often deviate.303
For decades, scholars have argued about whether absolute priority is
essential to a properly functioning bankruptcy system. Some scholars have
proposed an alternative regime known as “relative priority,” which would
allow junior creditors to share in the future value of the reorganized
debtor.304 The American Bankruptcy Institute has recently entered the fray
with a proposal to adopt its own version of relative priority.305
Too often the debates about these priority schemes devolve into an
inquiry about nonbankruptcy entitlements and whether one rule is
required by the Creditors’ Bargain. The conventional argument for
absolute priority is that the only way to respect nonbankruptcy
entitlements is to pay the creditors as if the debtor ﬁrm is being

300. The Code also includes a catchall provision allowing the court to intervene where
the sale is suspect. See id. § 363(e) (directing the court to prohibit a sale “as is necessary to
provide adequate protection” of a stakeholder’s interest).
301. See Baird, Priority Matters, supra note 30, at 786–87 (“If one creditor has priority
over another, this creditor needs to be paid in full before the other is entitled to receive
anything.”).
302. Walter J. Blum & Stanley A. Kaplan, The Absolute Priority Doctrine in Corporate
Reorganizations, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 651, 652 (1974) (“[B]efore a class of investors can
participate in a reorganization, all more senior classes must be compensated in full for their
claims, measured on the basis of their priorities upon involuntary liquidation . . . .”).
303. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 52, at 911–13 (noting the deviations from
absolute priority); Roe & Tung, supra note 31, at 1269 (describing the importance of
modern priority jumping schemes over absolute priority guidelines).
304. See, e.g., Baird, Priority Matters, supra note 30, at 789–806 (describing relative
priority and its appeal).
305. Comm’n to Study the Reform of Chapter 11, Am. Bankr. Inst., 2012–2014: Final
Report and Recommendations 208–09 (2014), https://abiworld.app.box.com/s/
vvircv5xv83aavl4dp4h [https://perma.cc/WV8H-8CSU] [hereinafter ABI Report].
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liquidated.306 Others have countered that absolute priority unnecessarily
terminates junior investors’ future interests even though the debtor is not
actually liquidated.307 A relative priority system that kept those future
interests alive might, they argue, be more consistent with the Creditors’
Bargain.308
These debates are not focused on the right question. The right
question is whether one system does a better job at reducing the hold-up
problem. Any system that allows the debtor to ﬁle bankruptcy to
signiﬁcantly reduce the value of a senior creditor’s claim would create
incentives for debtors and junior investors to threaten a bankruptcy ﬁling
in order to extract a hold-up payment. On the other hand, a bankruptcy
rule that entitles secured creditors to destroy signiﬁcant option value that
belongs to junior creditors would also lead to a hold-up problem.
As this Article demonstrates, the New Bargaining Theory provides
that bankruptcy law should implement a default rule that can be altered
subject to pricing mechanisms and evidentiary burdens. The most obvious
default rule—which is consistent with either absolute or relative priority—
is that the debtor must pay a senior secured creditor at least what that
creditor would have received in a nonbankruptcy foreclosure.309 Setting
that rule ensures that the debtor cannot hold up senior creditors by
threatening bankruptcy as a means to underpay them.310
But—within a coherent renegotiation framework—this baseline can
be altered if the debtor meets certain requirements. A proper priority rule
306. See Barry E. Adler & Ian Ayres, A Dilution Mechanism for Valuing Corporations
in Bankruptcy, 111 Yale L.J. 83, 88–90 (2001) (describing the desirability of absolute priority
systems that uphold contractual agreements); Jackson, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements and
the Creditors’ Bargain, supra note 3, at 869 (arguing that the Creditors’ Bargain “requires
respecting a secured creditor’s ability to be paid ﬁrst”); Alan Schwartz, A Normative Theory
of Business Bankruptcy, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1199, 1202 (2005) (summarizing early theories
justifying absolute priority).
307. See Baird, Priority Matters, supra note 30, at 792–93 (arguing that relative priority
systems provide “the most sensible division of value”); Anthony J. Casey, The Creditors’
Bargain and Option-Preservation Priority in Chapter 11, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 759, 764–65
(2011) [hereinafter Casey, Creditors’ Bargain] (criticizing the destruction of future value
under the absolute priority rule); Jacoby & Janger, Ice Cube Bonds, supra note 12, at 913
(noting that sales under absolute priority terminate junior creditors’ interest in the future
value of the ﬁrm); Jacoby & Janger, Tracing Equity, supra note 12, at 678–81 (arguing
against absolute priority and in favor of a relative-priority-like “equitable realization” based
on nonbankruptcy entitlements).
308. See, e.g., Casey, Creditors’ Bargain, supra note 307, at 773 (“[An absolute priority
regime] alters the nonbankruptcy rights of the creditors[,] . . . act[ing] as a razor’s edge
that collapses all future possibilities to present value.”).
309. I have argued elsewhere for this baseline payment as part of a relative priority
mechanism. Id. at 765.
310. This analysis suggests that a recent controversial case was wrongfully decided. The
court in In re Sunnyslope Housing Ltd. Partnership interpreted the Bankruptcy Code to allow
the debtor to conﬁrm a plan that left the secured creditor holding a lien that was worth less
than the foreclosure value of its claim. See First S. Nat’l Bank v. Sunnyslope Hous. Ltd.
P’ship (In re Sunnyslope Hous. Ltd. P’ship), 859 F.3d 637, 646 (9th Cir. 2017).
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might include exceptions for rare cases when one party can show that
another party is indubitably asserting its priority rights as part of a hold-up
threat. Another exception might allow small deviations when the parties
advocating them can show—by evidence or market tests—that those
deviations are efficient and not part of a hold-up attempt.
The “new value exception” to priority that courts apply in Chapter 11
matches that last category of exceptions. The new value case law provides
that old equity owners of an insolvent ﬁrm can only take a stake in the
reorganized ﬁrm if they pay for that stake and if the payment is market
tested.311 Once again, the rule operates to curb hold up on both sides. Old
equity owners often exercise control in the bankruptcy process, especially
in smaller ﬁrms where they serve as managers. There is a constant risk that
they will use that control to hold up other stakeholders. On the ﬂip side,
the owners, managers, and founders of a debtor ﬁrm might be valuable
components of its going concern, and it might be in the interest of the
whole estate to include them in the reorganization. If one creditor could
absolutely veto the owners’ involvement going forward, that creditor
would possess a threat to derail the whole process. By allowing the owners’
involvement only after a robust market test, the new value exception
implements Chapter 11’s renegotiation framework to navigate between
these two threats.312
Notably, the priority guidance in this Part provides a range of
solutions that might take the form of modiﬁed absolute or relative priority.
The key takeaway is that the New Bargaining Theory does not require one
speciﬁc form of priority. Rather it simply gives us parameters or guardrails
311. See Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434,
457–58 (1999) (holding that plans allowing former owners to acquire new equity “free from
competition and without beneﬁt of market valuation” violate the absolute priority rule);
Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Boyd’s Legacy and Blackstone’s Ghost, 1999 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 393, 419 (summarizing case law on the new value exception). See generally
Randolph J. Haines, The Unwarranted Attack on New Value, 72 Am. Bankr. L.J. 387 (1998)
(describing the new value exception).
312. This analysis is important for bankruptcy systems in other countries as well. For
example, questions about new value and owner involvement in reorganization have been
front and center in debates about bankruptcy reforms in India. After India introduced its
bankruptcy reform in 2016, there was concern that owners were planning to use their
control of the ﬁrm to hold up creditors and remain in control of ﬁrms after reorganization.
See Deepshikha Sikarwar, Big Tweak in Insolvency Law on Cards, Defaulters May Be Barred
from Bidding, Econ. Times, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/
policy/big-tweak-in-insolvency-law-on-cards-defaulters-may-be-barred-from-bidding/
articleshow/61634341.cms [https://perma.cc/U7PZ-ZTY6] (last updated Nov. 14, 2017).
In response, the government amended the statute to prohibit the original owners of a ﬁrm
from participating in the reorganization. Samanwaya Rautray, Supreme Court Upholds
Bankruptcy Code, Rejects Promoters’ Challenges, Econ. Times, https://economictimes.
indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/supreme-court-upholds-insolvency-law-in-entirety/
articleshow/67683544.cms [https://perma.cc/FKQ4-DSGN] (last updated Jan. 26, 2019).
Litigants challenged the controversial provision’s validity in court. Id. On January 25, 2019,
the Indian Supreme Court upheld the validity of the entire bankruptcy law including the
amendment. Id.
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within which any chosen priority regime must operate. Notably, the
American Bankruptcy Institute’s relative priority proposal does not
explicitly include a requirement that the debtor’s estate pay senior
creditors an amount equal to the nonbankruptcy liquidation value of their
claims.313 Without that requirement, it is inconsistent with the New
Bargaining Theory and the renegotiation framework.
CONCLUSION
The Creditors’ Bargain cannot bear its status as the core theory of
bankruptcy. At best it is an analogy for the idea that bankruptcy law should
produce efficient outcomes across all states of the world. The Butner
Principle is a mere statement that bankruptcy law should pursue
bankruptcy purposes. These ideas do not state a full theory. And yet, over
the years, the Creditors’ Bargain Theory and the Butner Fallacy have
overgrown other ideas within bankruptcy scholarship. This Article is an
attempt to clear the brush and discover corporate bankruptcy’s fundamental purpose.
The New Bargaining Theory that emerges establishes that corporate
bankruptcy’s purpose is to solve the ubiquitous incomplete contracting
problem associated with ﬁnancial distress. In Chapter 11 the solution takes
the form of a structured renegotiation framework. The framework allows
parties to renegotiate their relationships within a system that allocates
certain decision powers, places prices and evidentiary burdens on the
exercise of those powers, and then subjects the resulting decisions to highlevel judicial oversight. The speciﬁcs of this framework target the worst and
most likely instances of hold up that can block coordinated renegotiation
efforts.
As noted above, the New Bargaining Theory and its manifestation in
Chapter 11’s renegotiation framework broadly explain bankruptcy’s core
features and resolve its thorniest problems. While this Article provides
some examples, space does not permit a full catalog of applications. A
similar analysis can be applied to other questions that have challenged

313. ABI Report, supra note 305, at 208–09, 218 (“[A] chapter 11 plan may be
conﬁrmed over the non-acceptance of a senior class of creditors, even if the senior class is
not paid in full within the meaning of the absolute priority rule . . . .”).
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courts, like settlements,314 gifting,315 debtor-in-possession ﬁnancing,316 and
opt-out mechanisms.317
The strong normative claim of this Article is that bankruptcy law’s
proper purpose is to solve the hold-up problem. The descriptive claim is
that Chapter 11 attempts to do this by implementing a structured
renegotiation framework. A remaining normative question is whether
Chapter 11 succeeds at this purpose. This Article’s main contribution is to
help identify the metrics by which to answer that question. Future
empirical research should test whether (1) Chapter 11 does in fact reduce
hold-up costs and (2) whether it does better than alternative regimes. The
answers may depend on the competency of bankruptcy judges, the
appropriateness of the law’s guardrails, and simply how good the parties
are at exploiting hold-up opportunities. No doubt, these questions will also
require comparative studies of the existing and emerging frameworks
implemented by other jurisdictions.
One hopes that Chapter 11 does reduce hold up, at least compared
to a bankruptcy state of nature. It is worth noting, however, that such a
claim will only be true if courts have the ability to accurately set or market
test the necessary prices within the framework. Throughout, this Article
discusses pricing mechanisms by which the courts test the efficiency and
hold-up risks associated with certain decisions. For those price tests to
work, the court needs to value the relevant assets, claims, and outcomes.
This may be the Achilles heel of Chapter 11’s renegotiation framework.
314. See, e.g., Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 981–83 (2017). In
addressing the question of whether a debtor can agree to receive a settlement payment that
requires it to alter the payment priority of creditors, the Supreme Court narrowly ruled that
such alterations are prohibited when they are part of a dismissal order or other ﬁnal
disposition of the case. Id. at 984–86. Consistent with the analysis throughout this Article,
ﬁnal dispositions are likely to be the situations where hold-up risk is at its highest. The Court
left open the possibilities of interim alterations where the hold-up risk is lower and where
the debtor can meet an evidentiary burden of showing that the alteration “would ‘enable a
successful reorganization and make even disfavored creditors better off.’” Id. at 985
(quoting In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 2004)). Consistent with the New
Bargaining Theory’s focus on relationship-speciﬁc investments, the Court also pointed out
that the prohibited alterations “do[] not preserve the debtor as a going concern . . . [and]
do[] not protect reliance interests.” Id. at 986.
315. See In re ICL Holding Co., Inc., 802 F.3d 547, 555 (3d Cir. 2015) (allowing side
payments, or gifts, when the funds did not come from the bankruptcy estate and thus were
not subject to the distribution priority rules).
316. See Transcript of Final Hearing on Motion for Post-Petition Financing Before the
Honorable Robert E. Gerber Chief U.S. Bankruptcy Judge at 732–40, In re Lyondell Chem.
Co., No. 09-10023 (REG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2009) (approving a debtor-in-possession
loan that included extreme terms drastically altering nonbankruptcy rights and shifting
power to creditors because it was evident that no other source of funding existed and the
alternative was liquidation).
317. See Franchise Servs. of N. Am., Inc. v. U.S. Tr. (In re Franchise Servs. of N. Am.,
Inc.), 891 F.3d 198, 209 (5th Cir. 2018) (approving a structure that allowed one equity
stakeholder the power to veto a bankruptcy ﬁling without discussion of the possibility of
hold up or the impact that such veto would have on renegotiation).
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Judicial valuation is messy and imperfect.318 That said, it is not completely
broken, and it can be ﬁxed.319 If anything, the analysis presented here
highlights the importance of research and reform agendas that focus on
valuation procedures and methodologies as the key to improving the
functioning of Chapter 11.

318. See Kenneth Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Valuation Disputes in Corporate
Bankruptcy, 166 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1819, 1845–46 (2018) (“Our quantitative analysis
demonstrates that disagreement about valuation is large and pervasive.”); Anthony J. Casey
& Julia Simon-Kerr, A Simple Theory of Complex Valuation, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 1175, 1177
(2015) (“It is no secret that courts are ill equipped to perform complex valuations—at least
on their own.”); Diane Lourdes Dick, Valuation in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy: The Dangers of
an Implicit Market Test, 2017 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1487, 1501 [hereinafter Dick, Valuation in
Chapter 11] (“Of course, judicial valuation is admittedly a costly and imprecise
exercise . . . .”); Keith Sharfman, Valuation Averaging: A New Procedure for Resolving
Valuation Disputes, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 357, 358–60 (2003) (“[C]ourts are ill-equipped to
assess expert valuation evidence and end up adopting arbitrary, unpredictable valuations
that fall somewhere between the widely divergent values offered by the parties.”).
319. See Casey & Simon-Kerr, supra note 318, at 1198–210 (proposing a new approach
to judicial valuation); Dick, Valuation in Chapter 11, supra note 318, at 1501–02
(considering proposals to improve valuation); Sharfman, supra note 318, at 372–77
(describing how the concept of valuation averaging could work in a variety of contexts).

